Afghanistan’s Security Landscape and What it Means for the Region?

Kainat Khan

From 2003 to 2014, Afghanistan made steady progress in environmental protection and ecosystem management, with earlier documents laying the groundwork for these advancements. In 2003, the interim government merged environmental protection with the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources, and Environment, leading to the creation of the first environmental regulation law under Article 15 of the national constitution. University professors, national and international NGOs, and other stakeholders contributed to this law, which called for the establishment of an independent agency for environmental protection.

China’s strategic interest in Afghanistan has grown, balancing economic ambitions with security concerns.

The National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was created, with government funding, structure, and staffing. National and international NGOs worked together to strengthen NEPA’s capacity, and by 2010, it was sufficiently developed to operate independently. By 2015, NEPA, along with several other ministries and NGOs, was functioning autonomously. During this time, Afghanistan ratified 16 Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Protocols, including the UNFCCC.

However, instead of building on these achievements and addressing existing weaknesses, the government introduced a new governance plan in 2015. This plan not only failed but also undermined the systematic progress made in the previous 14 years. Many institutional structures, including NEPA, were altered, and experienced staff were replaced with younger, less experienced individuals, often brought in from Western countries. This marked the beginning of the government’s decline, which culminated in its collapse in 2021.

In the context of Afghanistan’s ongoing military and political transitions, this article argues that the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will prompt countries with a vested interest in Afghanistan’s future to reassess their strategies and likely intensify their engagement. For example, Pakistan and India are expected to increase their activities within Afghanistan.

A crucial question for analysis is: What strategies will neighboring states adopt after the withdrawal? The exit of international forces is encouraging external stakeholders—such as Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, and some Central Asian republics—to fill the political and strategic void left behind in a post-ISAF/NATO Afghanistan.

Political and military developments in the region have the potential to create tensions between Kabul and some of its key partners—specifically New Delhi, Tehran, and Moscow—leading these countries to act more as ‘limited spoilers’ rather than partners. The uncertainty surrounding the situation is exacerbated by the possibility of a Taliban resurgence and the potential influence that Pakistan could reclaim in shaping Afghanistan’s future. Even a partial return of the Taliban could fuel a narrative with significant regional repercussions.

Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth, including lithium and copper, remains a key interest for Chinese investment.

For instance, the defeat of a second superpower (along with its coalition partners) by determined radical Islamic fighters could inspire a new wave of Islam-inspired extremism across the region. To assess whether Afghanistan’s external stakeholders can contribute to stability, this article examines the intricate dynamics between Afghanistan’s national security goals and the interests of its key partners—India, Iran, and Russia.

Additionally, it explores Afghanistan’s ‘greedy spoiler’ dilemma (Pakistan) and the potential consequences of a ‘total spoiler’ (the Taliban). The analysis will highlight areas of conflict and cooperation, and identify emerging patterns of spoiler behavior that could threaten bilateral relations as Afghanistan works to prevent the return of the Taliban.

In understanding the future trajectory of Afghanistan, it is imperative to consider the interests and roles of its neighboring countries. These countries not only influence Afghanistan’s security and political landscape but also shape its economic and geopolitical significance. Key to this analysis are Afghanistan’s powerful neighbors—China, Iran, and Pakistan—along with the relatively weaker states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Examining the positioning and actions of these countries offers valuable insights into Afghanistan’s future.

China’s relationship with Afghanistan has evolved significantly over the decades, reflecting shifting geopolitical and economic priorities. The Wakhan Corridor, a narrow passage that connects Afghanistan to China, historically served as a vital link in the Silk Road, facilitating trade and cultural exchange between Asia’s diverse civilizations. Though the region no longer holds the same importance due to security concerns, it remains a symbolic connection between the two nations, harking back to an era of commerce and communication that helped shape both societies.

China’s formal diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan began in the 1950s, though at that time Afghanistan played a peripheral role in Chinese foreign policy. In the 1970s, China extended its support to Afghanistan’s resistance forces against the Soviet invasion, marking an early foray into the country’s politics. However, it wasn’t until the 21st century, particularly following the U.S.-led invasion after 9/11, that Afghanistan began to hold greater significance in China’s diplomatic strategies.

China engages with the Taliban diplomatically to ensure Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for extremist groups.

Afghanistan’s strategic location and resource-rich landscape caught China’s attention, particularly in the realm of natural resources. The vast mineral wealth in Afghanistan—ranging from gold, silver, copper, to uranium and lithium—has been a potential goldmine for Chinese investment. In fact, China made early inroads into Afghanistan’s mining sector, with the Chinese Mining Corporation (MCC) securing contracts to extract copper in Logar province. However, these ventures have faced significant challenges, including local opposition and controversies surrounding the preservation of Afghanistan’s rich archaeological sites.

Despite these difficulties, some analysts believe that China might seek to exploit Afghanistan’s resources further, particularly in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent power vacuum. However, the reality of investing in Afghanistan has proven complex. China’s track record in similar regions suggests that large-scale investments in Afghanistan may not materialize swiftly. The instability and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, coupled with challenges such as security risks and logistical difficulties, have dampened China’s enthusiasm for committing major resources to the region.

While China has maintained a cautious approach to direct military involvement, it has been actively engaged in Afghanistan’s peace process. Since 2014, China has participated in peace talks involving the Taliban, playing a key role in facilitating discussions between various Afghan factions. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has sought to stabilize Afghanistan politically in order to protect its broader regional economic interests, particularly in Central Asia and Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s ongoing instability, especially the return of the Taliban, poses a significant threat to China’s regional ambitions. The resurgence of militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a major concern for China, as these groups are believed to have links with separatist movements in China’s Xinjiang region. To mitigate these risks, China has sought cooperation from the Taliban to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a sanctuary for groups targeting China’s interests. Though China has not formally recognized the Taliban government, it has engaged with them diplomatically and provided humanitarian assistance to reinforce its security objectives.

China’s primary interest in Afghanistan remains focused on limiting the spread of violent extremism and ensuring that Afghan territory is not used to launch attacks on Chinese soil. As the global leader in renewable energy production, China’s growing demand for lithium and other critical minerals further underscores its interest in Afghanistan’s natural resources. However, China is unlikely to make any major investments in Afghanistan until it is assured that the country can maintain stability and security, particularly along its borders.

Instability in Afghanistan hampers China’s ability to make large-scale economic investments despite its long-term regional ambitions.

Afghanistan’s role in global geopolitics and regional dynamics is inextricably tied to the interests and actions of its neighbors. China, as one of Afghanistan’s most powerful neighbors, has displayed an evolving strategic interest in the country, balancing economic ambitions with security concerns. While Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth holds potential for Chinese investment, the ongoing instability and security threats stemming from insurgent groups make large-scale engagement difficult.

China’s role in Afghanistan’s future will likely be one of cautious diplomacy, with a primary focus on securing its regional economic projects and limiting the spread of extremism. Ultimately, the direction of China-Afghanistan relations will depend on the stability of the region and Afghanistan’s ability to create a conducive environment for foreign investments and partnerships.

The author is an MPhil student in International Relations at the National Defense University.