Floods, Fear, Responsibility

Qazi Hussain Asghar

India and Pakistan are again locked in a dangerous feedback loop of geopolitics and water. After a summer of brutal monsoon downpours, India opened gates on several dams in its portion of the Kashmir region and warned Pakistan about possible downstream flooding. Pakistan in turn issued alerts on rivers flowing from India as swollen tributaries threatened Punjab’s farms and cities. The timing, late August, at monsoon peak, has already displaced well over 200,000 people in Pakistan and added fuel to an already volatile political narrative.

“When catchments are drenched and reservoirs brim, opening gates downstream multiplies risk for people with the least margin for error.”

Let’s anchor what is verified. First, the flooding is real and grim. News agencies report hundreds of deaths and mass displacement across eastern Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa this month as cloudbursts and landslides compounded riverine floods. Experts note a clear climate signal: warmer air holds more moisture, making South Asia’s monsoon more erratic and flood-prone.

Second, India’s dam releases came with advance warnings to Pakistan, according to multiple outlets. Whether driven by safety (“too much water behind the wall”) or strategy (“release when it hurts your rival most”) is where accusations ignite. But even if motive is debated, the trans-boundary hazard is not. When catchments are drenched and reservoirs brim, opening gates downstream into already flooded plains multiplies risk for people with the least margin for error.

Third, the rules; the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty allocates the three “western rivers” (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan and the three “eastern rivers” (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India, while permitting specified uses and mandating data sharing. Its resilience surviving wars owes to technical guardrails and World Bank facilitation. Allegations that one side is “closing” or “weaponizing” water must be tested against the treaty’s specific provisions on flood releases, storage limits and notification duties, not just political rhetoric.

Where politics intrudes most forcefully is around “Operation Sindoor,” India’s May 2025 strikes following terror attacks allegedly linked to Pakistan, though India offered no public evidence. Indian and Pakistani accounts diverge sharply on targets, outcomes and legality. Indian political figures are now debating whether the operation was halted under external pressure. In such a febrile context, any major water move, even one justified by reservoir safety will be read as coercive. That is precisely why treaty-bound, third-party-verified data sharing and flood coordination are indispensable right now.

“Any major water move, even one justified by reservoir safety, will be read as coercive.”

But the risk is escalating further. Reportedly, one neighboring country has cautioned Pakistan about significant Indian military movements near the Pakistan-India border, echoing the pattern that preceded India’s airstrikes on May 6, 2025. Moreover, just days ago, India issued a new NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) for September 1-2, 2025, similar in language and scope to the pre-strike NOTAM of early May. These developments raise the specter of fresh Indian military aggression against Pakistan, potentially under the pretext of cross-border militancy or domestic political gain.

If India chooses to strike again, it may employ a hybrid “Surgical + Swarm” strategy, targeted airstrikes backed by cyber disruptions and rapid drone incursions to limit ground escalation but maximize media and psychological impact. However, miscalculation is almost guaranteed in such high-pressure scenarios. A limited strike could trigger full-spectrum retaliation by Pakistan under its doctrine of “full deterrence,” pulling both nuclear-armed states into a disastrous spiral.

Civilian casualties, refugee displacements in border regions and retaliatory damage to infrastructure (power grids, transport networks, irrigation) could push millions into poverty, inflate commodity prices across the region, destabilize investment flows and provoke wider regional militarization. With South Asia already housing over 40% of the world’s poor, war would deepen human insecurity and erase decades of development gains, especially in fragile flood-hit districts.

The World Bank and neutral hydrological bodies should facilitate near-real-time, public dashboards of releases and river levels at key cross-border points through the monsoon. That reduces space for rumor and retaliatory escalations while helping downstream evacuation planning. This is squarely in the IWT’s spirit even when bilateral relations are strained.

Cloudbursts and rain “bombs” are outpacing legacy design assumptions. Investing in shared radar coverage, glacial lake outburst early warnings and dam-break consequence modeling for the Indus system will save lives regardless of politics. AP’s reporting underlines the accelerating climate risks; the case for regional early-warning interoperability is overwhelming.

“A limited strike could trigger full-spectrum retaliation, pulling both nuclear-armed states into a disastrous spiral.”

Evacuations, shelter, water, and health services in Pakistan’s flooded districts must be insulated from geopolitics. Disasters in the Asia-Pacific are already displacing more people than anywhere else; funding windows should expand automatically when river gauges breach thresholds, not after diplomatic sparring.

South Asia’s people are absorbing disproportionate climate harm relative to their contribution to the problem. Consider a few hard comparisons as per-capita emissions (2023, CO₂ only): United States ≈ 14 t/person; EU ≈ 6–7 t; India ≈ 2 t; Pakistan ≈ <1 t. The gap is stark: an average American emits about 7–14 times more than an average South Asian.

The United States and Europe together account for the largest cumulative share of CO₂ since 1850, the metric most correlated with warming; South Asia’s historical share is far smaller. That history matters when assigning finance for adaptation and loss and damage. The total emissions are shifting toward Asia and India is now the third-largest emitter by volume. But per-capita and historical baselines still determine fairness in who pays to protect flood-plain families now being repeatedly displaced.

If developed countries want to be taken seriously when they speak of “rules-based order,” they must fund the rules’ resilience where climate and conflict intersect: independent hydrology, open data, dam safety retrofits and anticipatory finance that reaches districts before the water does. The same governments whose cumulative emissions helped supercharge today’s monsoons should not hesitate to underwrite Indus-basin adaptation at scale because the next surge will come sooner than the budget cycle.

“The monsoon does not care about talking points; the only strength is protecting civilians on both sides of a single river system.”

Finally, to India and Pakistan: the monsoon does not care about talking points. When reservoirs fill and sirens sound, the only credible measure of strength is how well you protect civilians on both sides of a border drawn across a single river system. That means rigorous notification, coordinated gate operations where possible and zero tolerance for information darkness. The world is watching and owes the basin far more than thoughts and prayers.

Qazi Hussain Asghar is an Islamabad-based PhD scholar.