Why Taiwan’s Security Matters to Everyone
September 19, 2025
Zainab Chaudhary
The withdrawal of the United States of America’s activities in Afghanistan in August 2021 not only ended a 20-year-long war but also changed the situation in the region fundamentally. To Pakistan, the exit of the American troops has been both a relief and a challenge. On the one hand, its borders had always been viewed as a threat to stability due to the presence of foreign troops on its borders. Conversely, the ensuing vacuum has emboldened insurgent groups like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which casts critical doubts on the counter-terrorism policy of Pakistan and the future of its diplomatic relations with Washington.
The resurgence of militancy threatens hard-won security gains and demands consistent, coherent counterterrorism policies.
The renaissance of the TTP is not an imaginary threat; it is a reality that is occurring. The assault against security agencies in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan has been on the increase over recent months, thus compromising decades of hard-won counter terrorist benefits. A significant number of these groups take advantage of the porous borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which takes advantage of the fact that the Taliban are not willing or even able to cut off their links with the militant groups. This relationship places Islamabad in a delicate situation where it has to maintain a stable relationship with the new rulers of Kabul and, at the same time, protect its sovereignty against cross-border terrorism.
With the exit of conventional military forces out of Afghanistan, the United States nonetheless continues to shape counter-terrorism policy in the framework of the global security threat. The fears of Washington go beyond the local circumstances of militancy to include the long-term threat that Afghanistan would again be the refuge of transnational terrorist organisations. Even in the face of redeployment of ground troops, the American assets, like unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence activities, and economic leverage, remain a potent tool for manipulating the security dynamics in the region. In turn, this leads to a key question, namely, can Pakistan and the United States establish a new partnership to address this emerging menace despite the decades-long mistrust, which has defined the nature of the bilateral relationship between the two countries?
Both states have a long history and this fact only enhances the level of difficulty. Washington has often accused Islamabad of providing a haven to militant actors and Pakistan resents being viewed as a scapegoat to the failure of American actions in Afghanistan. However, the realities of strategy insist that neither party can do away with the other. The US, with no presence on the ground in Afghanistan, continues to be dependent on the unparalleled intelligence networks of Pakistan, and its counter-terrorism capabilities are dependent on the financial, technological, and diplomatic assistance that can be provided only by the United States.
To facilitate the development of a collaborative framework, both governments have to leave behind the transactional pattern of relationship that has featured both governments over the decades. Counter-terrorism cannot devolve to an Islamabad solitary directive or to the provision of an ad hoc military aid package. Rather, it must be mounted on a broad vision of regional stability. This requires Washington to invest in the institutional capacity of Pakistan- police professionalisation, physical infrastructure of border control and intelligence-sharing platforms instead of depending on military aid only.
Durable cooperation requires moving beyond transactional ties to capacity-building, socio-economic development, and shared responsibility.
Pakistan also needs to maintain credibility through the adoption of a consistent, internally coherent counter-terrorism policy. The discriminating focus on militant groups or the use of nonstate actors to establish temporary geopolitical advantages has been historically counterproductive, undermining security and destroying the confidence of the population. The most realistic policy is a zero-tolerance policy that is backed by wide political support. Additionally, Pakistan ought to position the problem of terrorism as a domestic one by highlighting it as a matter of internal challenge that weakens national sovereignty and unity as opposed to a foreign one.
The other important dimension is the socio-economic basis of militancy. Pakistan has been underdeveloped, many have been unemployed and basic services are lacking in its border provinces. In this type of setting, extremist groups thrive through offering different forms of governance and economic incentives. As a result, the collaboration between the U.S. and Pakistan must include not only security operations, but also overall development programmes of these vulnerable areas. A focus on education, digital connectivity, and small-scale infrastructure projects can significantly reduce the recruitment pathways, which is more effective than kinetic intervention, like aerial strikes.
The dynamics of the greater geopolitical environment is a powerful factor here. The United States now places greater emphasis on its competition with the People’s Republic of China and its relations with India as its strategic ally, thus pushing Pakistan to the back seat in the foreign policy structure of Washington. However, it would be a tactical mistake to wholesale marginalize Pakistan. The untenable Pakistan, with one proverbial foot in the militant insurgent and the other in the economic frailty, would put the stability of the South Asian region at risk and vice versa complicate the U.S. strategic interests. Therefore, Washington has an interest in reengaging Islamabad in a constructive way, though rooted in realistic expectations.
In the case of Pakistan, participation in the counterterrorism operations with the United States does not imply hostilities with China or the undermining of the relationships with Kabul. Instead, it requires subtle diplomacy and establishes security cooperation without disrupting balanced relations with other players in the region. Pakistan should play a stabilizing role instead of a destabilizing role in the regional security structures.
Regional stability hinges on balancing security partnerships with inclusive growth and diplomatic engagement.
After all, the litmus test of Pakistan -United States relationships lies not only in cooperation during crises, but in the ability to develop a long-term relationship that will not be limited to occasional circumstances. Counterterrorism is a challenge and an opportunity at the same time; it can strengthen mutual trust when handled wisely and bring both states on the path to common goals of security. On the other hand, poor governance may further undermine the level of trust and make the two countries even more vulnerable to the recurrence of terrorism.
The most appropriate policy course is clear as far as Islamabad is concerned. Counterterrorism is by no means a favor to the United States but a primary issue for the survival and sovereignty of Pakistan. By accepting this fact, Pakistan will be able to redefine its relationship with Washington as an egalitarian interaction instead of a dependent one, thus facing the common menace together.
The author is a PolicyEast USA-Group intern with a focus on economic diplomacy and regional integration. She is currently pursuing an MPhil at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and contributes analysis on South Asian trade policy, sustainability, and international economic framework.
