Izza Khawar
The international system is changing profoundly. The end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world, with China’s ascent, Russian assertiveness, stronger middle powers, and a more fractured order, have placed the United Nations in a precarious position. Founded after World War II to ensure collective security and develop multilateral relations, the UN now operates amid strategic rivalry, deepening polarisation, and eroding consensus among major powers. The key concern now is not the UN’s necessity, but whether it can function in a multipolar system marked by conflict, not cooperation.
Historically, the UN’s efficiency had been linked to the existing power system. Throughout the Cold War, the organisation was limited by superpower rivalry, but it remained relevant for diplomatic and crisis resolution. In the post-Cold War era, relative US supremacy facilitated increased UN action, particularly for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and norm-building.
However, the contemporary trend towards multipolarity has diminished this operating space. Power is now distributed among numerous parties with opposing objectives and threat perceptions. This transition is the central point of this article, i.e., the UN’s future will be determined by its capacity to adapt institutionally and politically to multipolar circumstances, rather than striving to preserve an outdated post-1945 order.
The UN Security Council is the clearest example of this issue. The veto authority of all five permanent members, originally designed to maintain great-power unanimity, has progressively resulted in deadlock. Wars in Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza demonstrate how regional rivalry among major countries stifles collective action, especially in instances involving civilian suffering. Scholarly analyses often highlight how the Security Council’s deadlock has harmed the UN’s credibility as a global agent of security and peace. At the same time, efforts for reform like expanding permanent membershipor restricting veto use in circumstances of mass atrocities have stalled due to opposition from power holders.
The humanitarian crisis in Gaza demonstrates the gap between UN legitimacy and enforcement capacity. Israel’s military operation led toone of the most dangerous periods for people and UN staff in the organization’s history. From October 2023 until mid-2024, around 193 UN aid workers were killed while more than 150 UN-linked sites were destroyed, hampering humanitarian operations.
This deterioration proceeded despite the UN Secretary-General’s repeated calls for ceasefires. The demolition of the UNRWA headquarters in East Jerusalem severely weakened the UN’s operational presence. Gaza demonstrates how significant UN engagement does not always result in civilian protection when powerful governments lack political commitment in a polarised international climate.
Similarly, Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused widespread civilian displacement, infrastructure destruction, and ongoing misery. While the UNGA has repeatedly denounced the invasion and affirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, the Security Council remains paralyzed by Russia’s veto. This contradiction, where a main party to a crisis blocks action, shows how great-power rivalry in a multipolar world limits the UN’s collective security role.
Beyond high-profile conflicts, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan/South Sudan demonstrates the inefficiency of multinational solutions. Tens of millions of people risk food insecurity, displacement, and terrorism, but these crises receive little international attention, despite repeated UN warnings. This carelessness is exacerbated by the UN’s financial situation. Persistent funding constraints have prompted cuts to crucial initiatives in health, migration, and peacekeeping, reducing response capability while global humanitarian needs grow.
These constraints can also be seen in peacekeeping efforts, like in southern Lebanon, where UNIFIL troops are targeted directly. While the UN has a mandate to stabilise the region, its failure to enforce obedience or deter violations highlights a broader structural weakness, i.e., peacekeeping missions rely on the approval/support of regional and local actors, which is becoming increasingly rare in a highly contentious geopolitical environment.
Additionally, unconventional territorial objectives like Greenland after Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, reflect a larger pattern in which power politics progressively outdo multilateral norms. Such situations reflect a change in major countries’ priorities towards unilateral dominance over institutional constraint.
When taken collectively, these cases indicate three consistent trends. First, humanitarian crises remain unabated throughout regions, despite UN intervention. Second, structural constraints like veto-ism and great-power competition restrict collective action. Third, the UN’s operational credibility is deteriorating as its staff, facilities, and missions face growing scrutiny on the ground.
In conclusion, the United Nations is in the process of realigning its strategic priorities. A multipolar world restricts power while reinforcing its necessity. The UN’s future will be determined less by restoring great-power consensus and more by adjusting to fragmentation while maintaining credibility as a crucial (albeit flawed) component of global governance. For policymakers and researchers alike, the question is not whether the UN is capable of returning to a bygone era of cooperation, but rather how it may operate credibly in a world characterised by strategic competition.
The author is a graduate of MS Strategic Studies from the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Her academic focus centres on Middle Eastern politics and security dynamics, with particular emphasis on contemporary conflicts and regional power rivalries.
