Ammarah Ali
As debates on decoupling from Beijing echo in Europe and the Indo-Pacific prepares for economic realignment, Central Asian countries are gradually becoming China’s most consequential economic partners, with no clear view on what that future should look like. While Chinese initiatives have brought much-needed trade and infrastructure opportunities to the landlocked region of Central Asia, it has also exposed persistent structural vulnerabilities in Central Asian economies, paving the way for renewed discussions over economic dependency, limited diversification, and the sustainability of current growth models.
Owing to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since 2014, Chinese economic activity in Central Asia has expanded from large loans for infrastructure projects to other forms of foreign direct investment, like building factories and modernizing the agricultural facilities. China is now counted among the largest trading partners of all Central Asian countries. The scale of China-Central Asia trade reached a new high in 2025, maintaining a positive growth for the fifth consecutive year. While China’s exports to Central Asia amounted to $71.2 billion, the imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion in the previous year.
In addition to the traditional energy and raw materials sectors, China has also been investing in a range of industries, including electric vehicle production and manufacturing, waste processing, mining, renewable energy, and more. According to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), these Chinese initiatives have greatly supported the overall industrial modernization and economic revitalization in the region.
While the growing Chinese presence in the region has helped the Central Asian states in turning the limitations of being ‘landlocked’ into advantages of being ‘land-linked’, there exist deep cracks in the picture. The reports highlight that China remains a major bilateral creditor for many Central Asian states. Likewise, the sustainability of China’s economic presence in Central Asia is not only shaped by trade volumes and infrastructure projects, but also by wider public perceptions that view these engagements with suspicion.
The locals assess China as a predatory state with unclear intentions. According to the Central Asia Barometer (CAB) survey, in 2023, 90% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 88% in Kyrgyzstan, and 83% in Uzbekistan showed concerns regarding land transfer to Chinese investors. Moreover, with countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan accumulating high levels of debt to Chinese banks, the idea of debt dependency has raised alarm bells among locals.
Similarly, the potential of these debt obligations to be exchanged for national assets also remains one of the core stimulators of public anxiety in Central Asia. These concerns gained momentum specifically in 2020, when China introduced a 2 percent ‘late fee’ on the total amount of Kyrgyzstan’s debt to China and the statement by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov came to surface that if they fail to pay portion of the loans granted by China on schedule, Kyrgyzstan will lose many of its national assets.
Even though the realities on the ground do not support claims of coercive debt traps by China, the persistence of these fears has tangible economic implications. These findings suggest that in Central Asia, Chinese loans and land leases are interpreted more as potential levers of control and erosion of sovereignty, and less as economic opportunities. Consequently, the citizens often press their local governments to revoke pro-Chinese policy changes and land leases. These disruptions have resulted in project delays, renegotiations, and increased scrutiny of Chinese investments, weakening the overall economic networks.
Most importantly, this debt vulnerability further deepens as Central Asian economies remain dependent on a handful of commodities and China as their primary trade partner. If such engagements endure, in the unexpected event of commodity price fluctuations or shifts in Beijing’s investment priorities, the Central Asian states may face reduced policy autonomy, financial strain, and limited growth prospects, accentuating the structural weaknesses in the current development model.
Central Asia’s engagement with China has redefined regional development pathways, offering vital investment opportunities for landlocked economies. However, these benefits have raised concerns over long-term dependency, rising debt, and limited economic diversification. Ultimately, how both sides adapt their policies to promote transparency, local capacity building, and diversified development will shape the region’s economic trajectory in the decades ahead.
Unless Beijing addresses the economic policy loopholes with genuine efforts at grassroots diplomacy through introducing initiatives that highlight cooperation, address local concerns, and directly engage the local population, these backlashes will constrain the long-term viability of its economic partnerships in Central Asia.
The author recently earned an MSC in Politics, Communications, and Data Analytics from the University of Essex. Her research focuses on counterinsurgency, emerging security trends, and the intersection of these security challenges with technology.
