Lola Azimova
Central Asia has become one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. China expands its Belt and Road Initiative, the European Union promotes new connectivity through the Global Gateway, Russia seeks to preserve its traditional influence, while Türkiye and the Gulf states steadily deepen their political and economic engagement. New diplomatic platforms emerge almost every year, each promising investment, infrastructure, and long-term cooperation.
At first glance, this appears to be a success story. Never before has Central Asia had so many partners willing to invest in its future. Yet this narrative hides a more fundamental problem. The region’s greatest challenge is no longer attracting external attention it is deciding what to do with it.
For years, discussions about Central Asia have revolved around a familiar question: Which external partner offers the greatest opportunities? China? Russia? The European Union? Türkiye? This debate, however, begins from a flawed assumption, that the region’s future depends primarily on choosing the right partner.
It does not. The real challenge facing Central Asia is not a shortage of partnerships but the absence of a coherent regional strategy capable of guiding those partnerships toward common regional objectives.
This distinction is more important than it appears. External powers naturally pursue their own strategic interests. China seeks secure trade corridors and long-term economic influence. Russia aims to preserve its geopolitical and security role. The European Union prioritizes resilient supply chains, energy diversification, and connectivity. Türkiye and the Gulf states are expanding their own political and economic presence. None of these objectives are illegitimate. Every major power behaves according to its own national interests.
The mistake lies elsewhere. Too often, Central Asia discusses how to adapt to the strategies of others instead of defining its own. Multi-vector diplomacy has undoubtedly helped the region avoid excessive dependence on any single actor. It has increased diplomatic flexibility and expanded economic opportunities. Yet multi-vectorism is a foreign policy instrument, not a regional vision. Balancing external powers cannot substitute for answering a far more difficult question: What kind of region does Central Asia want to become over the next twenty years?
The answer cannot be reduced to attracting more investment or launching new transport corridors. Infrastructure alone does not create regional integration. Connectivity alone does not create strategic autonomy. A railway may connect borders, but it cannot create common political priorities. A new investment project may stimulate economic growth, but it cannot replace a shared regional agenda.
This becomes particularly evident in areas where no external actor can provide lasting solutions. Water governance, climate adaptation, regional energy security, cross-border infrastructure, and supply chain resilience require coordination among Central Asian states themselves. These challenges cannot be outsourced to Beijing, Brussels, Moscow, or Ankara because they are fundamentally regional in nature.
To its credit, Central Asia has already begun moving in the right direction. Consultative meetings among regional leaders have become regular. Cross-border cooperation has expanded. Joint infrastructure initiatives are gradually replacing isolated national projects. These developments suggest that regionalism is no longer merely an academic concept but an emerging political reality.
Yet cooperation should not be mistaken for strategy. Holding more summits, signing more memoranda, or participating in additional C5+ formats does not automatically produce a common strategic vision. A region may become increasingly interconnected while remaining strategically fragmented. Unless cooperation is guided by clearly defined regional priorities, external actors will continue to shape the direction of regional development more effectively than the region shapes it itself.
Central Asia does not face a geopolitical crisis because too many powers are competing for influence. Competition, if managed wisely, can create opportunities. The greater risk is that the region becomes strategically important to everyone else before it becomes strategically coherent for itself. The question, therefore, is no longer who Central Asia should partner with. The question is whether Central Asia can define its own future before others define it on its behalf.
The author is associated with PolicyEast.
