Arslan Arshad
For decades, Oman turned a difficult geography into a diplomatic advantage. It shares the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, belongs to the Gulf Cooperation Council, maintains close relations with Washington, and has repeatedly offered a discreet channel between rivals. Yet the events of 2026 have exposed a hard truth: neutrality can create access, but it cannot by itself provide security.
That distinction became impossible to ignore on July 12, when Oman summoned Iran’s ambassador after drone attacks struck sites in Musandam and Al Wusta. Days later, tankers were hit off the Omani coast, while shipping through Hormuz fell to only four commodity vessels on July 20. No very large crude carrier or liquefied natural gas tanker was visibly recorded crossing that day. A country known for keeping regional conflict at arm’s length was suddenly confronting its physical consequences.
Oman’s response has been characteristically measured. It has continued discussions with Iran over safe navigation, worked with the International Maritime Organization on a transit corridor, and supported wider negotiations involving the United States, Qatar and Pakistan. Its foreign minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, has also called for Gulf security to move from “containment” towards inclusion, arguing that Iran and Iraq must be part of any durable regional framework.
The logic is persuasive. A security order designed mainly to isolate Iran has not prevented war, attacks on shipping or repeated crises around the strait. Excluding a major littoral state from regional arrangements guarantees that every incident becomes a test of deterrence rather than an opportunity for crisis management. Oman is therefore right to insist that Gulf security cannot be built against geography.
But inclusion is a principle, not yet a mechanism. The weakness of Oman’s traditional diplomacy is that it has depended heavily on personal trust, private messages and temporary negotiations. Those tools are valuable when leaders genuinely want an exit. They are less effective when attacks are deniable, military commands are fragmented, or states use talks to gain time and leverage. The drone strikes on Omani territory illustrate the problem: good relations with all sides did not produce a reliable warning system, an agreed investigation process or immediate accountability.
Muscat should now use its credibility to build a standing Hormuz security mechanism rather than another temporary ceasefire channel. Such a framework could establish a direct maritime hotline between Iran and the GCC states, common procedures for reporting and investigating attacks, and an internationally verified commitment against targeting commercial shipping.
The International Maritime Organization could provide technical support, while Oman could host regular meetings among the eight Gulf littoral states. Nuclear negotiations should remain linked to the International Atomic Energy Agency, while Qatar and Pakistan can continue political mediation. Dividing responsibilities would reduce the burden on Oman and make diplomacy less dependent on one capital or one relationship.
This would not require Oman to abandon neutrality. On the contrary, it would give neutrality a practical purpose. Muscat’s value has never come from silence or equal distance from every action; it comes from preserving communication while defending clear rules. Its decision to formally protest the drone attacks shows that mediation and firmness are not opposites.
There is also an economic reason to institutionalise this role. Oman is less exposed than several neighbours because important export infrastructure lies outside the Strait of Hormuz. A July Reuters poll consequently projected 3.1 percent growth for Oman in 2026, even as most Gulf economies faced contraction. Yet this relative protection should not be mistaken for immunity. Oman’s development strategy prioritises tourism, logistics, manufacturing and the digital economy, all sectors vulnerable to disrupted airspace, higher insurance costs and a permanent regional risk premium. A prolonged security crisis could weaken the very diversification intended to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons.
A formal mechanism would face resistance. Iran may view international verification as external intrusion; Washington may prefer military freedom of action; and some GCC states may distrust any arrangement that appears to legitimise Tehran’s regional role. Oman cannot erase those rivalries. It can, however, make escalation harder by ensuring that communication, verification and maritime rules survive even when political negotiations collapse.
Oman’s diplomacy has earned it a seat in rooms closed to others. The next stage is to build a room that does not disappear after every crisis. In the new Gulf, neutrality should not mean standing between opposing fires. It should mean constructing institutions that prevent the next spark from becoming another war.
Arslan is a third-year law student at the University of London with an interest in international law, global affairs, governance and public policy. He is an active mooter who has participated in several international moot court competitions, including the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition twice, and will participate in FDI Moot 2026.
