Izza Khawar
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming not only civilian life, but also the structure of global power and military competition. As nations increase their expenditures on AI-enabled systems, there are growing concerns that we are on the verge of an AI arms race, i.e., a competitive scenario in which strategic edge, rather than safety and stability, drives decisions. This possible weapons race has ramifications similar to the Cold War’s nuclear rivalry, but with an increased degree of complexity, transparency, and risk of unintentional escalation.
The term “arms race” in AI pertains to the aggressive advancement of AI capabilities, notably in tactical and strategic areas, with states vying for first-mover advantage. Unlike traditional arms races, the AI variant employs dual-use inventions, i.e., systems that serve both civilian and military objectives and is rooted in global technical ecosystems governed by both state and private players. The core point of this essay is that without strong governance frameworks, the incorporation of AI into military systems may destabilise strategic relations, lower conflict thresholds, and encourage riskier decision-making, necessitating calibrated international collaboration.
AI’s usefulness to military strategy has long been evident. Modern defence strategies primarily rely on AI for data fusion, concentration, and battlefield management. For example, the US Department of Defence’s JADC2 effort aims to combine sensors and forces from many service branches into integrated AI-powered networks to speed up decision-making. This mirrors a global trend in which AI is integrated into military strategy to obtain a competitive advantage.
At the same time, automated weaponry and intelligence tools challenge the conventional role of human judgment in conflict. According to research, the implementation of AI-powered autonomous weapons systems (AWS) might reduce the political and human costs of combat, making offensive operations more appealing while increasing geopolitical tensions. These systems, by replacing human agency with technology, have the potential to speed crisis decision cycles, increasing the danger of unintended amplification.
Beyond combat automation, major nations compete in AI research and development, prompting concerns about strategic asymmetry. China’s military-civil fusion policy incorporates civilian AI developments into defence applications, accelerating capabilities like robot submarines and ISR systems. In contrast, in the US model, private innovation is dominant but increasingly aligned with security interests. According to comparative evaluations, this variance in AI strategy increases competitive pressure, i.e., governments are concerned about falling behind in important military technology, undermining deterrence and impacting global hierarchies.
The concept of an AI weapons race has drawn obvious parallels to historical strategic competitions. Some experts believe that unchecked AI growth could mirror features of the nuclear weapons race, but with substantially less precision and control. In the nuclear era, procedures such as agreements on arms control and mutually assured destruction (MAD) shaped strategic dynamics; in the AI environment, there is no comparable solid global framework. This absence enhances the possibility of “race-to-the-bottom” tendencies in safety threshold and ethical standards, increasing the likelihood that states may prioritise competence over control.
This competitive atmosphere is exacerbated by proven gaps in AI safety policies at prominent technological companies. According to the Future of Life Institute assessment, key AI developers such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, and xAI fail to meet growing global safety criteria for managing advanced AI risk. Despite substantial expenditures, none had credible plans for supervising highly competent systems, revealing a larger governance need. This situation is alarming in cases where military demand drives the deployment of AI systems before appropriate safety procedures are implemented.
Some recent developments highlight the complexities of these processes. According to reports, conflicts exist between defence authorities and AI startups over usage limitations, with the military pushing to loosen restrictions on AI applications for combat use. Although such cases are still fought and largely rejected by the companies concerned, they highlight the conflict between commercial safety rules and strategic imperatives.
In reaction to these risks, there were early attempts at international cooperation. Diplomatic endeavours such as the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain gathered together 60 countries to support a demand for responsible use of AI in military systems and to investigate regulations for autonomous systems. This meeting also witnessed the release of the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, a non-enforceable concept signed by a number of states to create common norms for military AI. While these diplomatic steps are significant, they lack mechanisms for enforcement and do not address more fundamental issues of strategic stability or provocation threats.
A careful examination of the AI weapons race uncovers significant systemic issues. First, the dual-use aspect of AI renders it impossible to distinguish between civilian and military research. Standards and precautions that apply in one area may not easily transfer to another. Second, geopolitical competition, particularly among large countries like the US and China, generates incentives to prioritise strategic advantage over collaboration. Third, International law, regulations, and verification procedures fall behind technological capabilities, restricting collective risk mitigation.
Meeting these difficulties necessitates a diverse policy response. Nations must invest in public safety research, align regulatory standards, and explore international agreements that contain accountability provisions. Joint research endeavours and formal treaties, such as suggestions for worldwide computing restrictions on sophisticated AI systems, could help to regulate competitive excesses and decrease destabilising incentives. Furthermore, including human judgment as a safety backup in military artificial intelligence and recognising this necessity in international conventions will help to reduce escalation risks.
To conclude, while the global AI competition holds potential for economic expansion and scientific advancement, it also poses hazards to strategic stability and international safety if not managed prudently. The current trajectory shows that an unrestrained AI arms race might destabilise international relations and decrease the threshold for violence. Efforts must be made to create frameworks that balance innovation and safety, ensuring that AI promotes, instead of harming, strategic stability in today’s world.
The author is a graduate of MS Strategic Studies from the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Her academic focus centres on Middle Eastern politics and security dynamics, with particular emphasis on contemporary conflicts and regional power rivalries.
