Aleena Yousuf
It has been nearly four years since the Russia–Ukraine war began, and Europe has found itself in one of the most precarious security situations since the end of the Cold War. After World War II, Europe was determined never again to fight a major war on their own soil, placing their faith in collective security structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter aggression and preserve peace.
In the post–Cold War era, NATO’s expansion provided an added layer of assurance, even as it underscored growing apprehension toward Russia’s intentions. When that fear materialized in 2022, it brought large-scale war back to Europe’s doorstep, challenging long-held assumptions about the continent’s immunity from armed conflict.
Since then, European countries have mobilized significant resources in support of Ukraine, politically, economically, and militarily, highlighting their solidarity with Kyiv. Although Europe has provided more than $ 197 billion in aid to Ukraine, it remains heavily reliant on the United States for leadership, advanced military equipment, and financial backing that are critical to Ukraine’s ongoing defense.
This dependence raises urgent questions about Europe’s strategic autonomy, the effectiveness of its security policies, and the extent to which it can respond to future threats without external assistance. The central argument of this essay is that while the war in Ukraine has catalyzed a necessary reevaluation of European defense, this transformation remains incomplete and uneven, exposing enduring vulnerabilities in Europe’s security architecture.
For decades, NATO members have discussed defense spending benchmarks, most notably the target of allocating 2% of GDP to defense. Yet even before the war, many European states struggled to meet that goal, and ambitions at the 2025 NATO summit to raise defense spending further, to as much as 5% of GDP by2035, underscore the gap between aspirations and current realities. Such discussions reflect a collective acknowledgment that Europe remains underprepared for high-intensity conflict and must modernize its armed forces and defense industries to reduce shortfalls in readiness and deterrence.
Beyond fiscal and industrial challenges, the war has reignited debates about military manpower. Across the continent, policymakers are revisiting the idea of military conscription practice long abandoned by many Western European countries. Inspired in part by Ukraine’s mobilization efforts and confronted with aging populations and shrinking volunteer enlistments, some states are considering reintroducing compulsory service to bolster their defense forces. Yet these discussions are deeply contested, revealing different national priorities and public sentiments toward military service.
While these patterns suggest a European awakening to the realities of great-power competition, they also reveal enduring limitations. The profound reliance on the United States, both for security guarantees under Article 5 of the NATO treaty and for the provision of high-end military capabilities, has persisted throughout the conflict. European leaders frequently acknowledge that without American engagement, Ukraine’s resistance would be far less sustainable, and Europe’s own defense posture more precarious. This dependency undercuts claims of European autonomy and highlights the structural imbalance at the heart of transatlantic security relations.
Moreover, Europe’s internal fragmentation complicates collective action. The European Union’s foreign and security policy mechanisms often require unanimity among member states that makes swift, robust responses difficult when strategic interests diverge. Public opinion itself varies widely across the continent, with some societies keen on deeper defense commitments and others more cautious about entanglement in protracted conflicts. In this context, the war in Ukraine functions both as a catalyst for debate and as a mirror reflecting the divergent strategic cultures within Europe.
Europe’s current moment is best understood not as a completed transformation but as a contested transition, a juncture between past assumptions of peace and a future where security must be actively defended. The war in Ukraine has unquestionably pushed European governments to rethink defense priorities, address capability gaps, and engage more deeply with questions of strategic autonomy. Yet these shifts are uneven and fraught with political trade-offs that extend beyond mere resource allocation.
In conclusion, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has laid bare the fragility of Europe’s long-held security paradigm. While the conflict has galvanized unprecedented support for Ukraine and stimulated discussions about defense modernization and autonomy, Europe remains deeply reliant on the United States and hampered by internal divisions and capability shortfalls.
To strengthen its security and reduce dependency on external actors, Europe must pursue coherent defense planning, harmonized capability development, and institutional reforms that enable decisive collective action. Without such efforts, the continent risks remaining reactive and fragmented in the face of future geopolitical shocks. The war in Ukraine may have awakened Europe to its vulnerabilities, yet the hard work of building credible, self-sustaining security remains far from complete.
The author is a PPE (Philosophy, Politics & Economics) student at the Aga Khan University Faculty of Arts and Sciences with an interest in geopolitics, current affairs and political economy.
