Raqia Ismail Hassan
United States’ president, Donald Trump in reference to Greenland, initiated an unconventional diplomatic proposal which is ‘buying Greenland’, a self-governing semi-autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. He has floated the possibility of the US purchasing Greenland. While these claims remain rhetorical rather than operational policy, they have raised important questions regarding alliance reliability, and the sovereignty of a NATO associated country.
Denmark has warned, a seizure of the Island could tear up international law and the NATO alliance reflecting broader concerns regarding mutual constraint.
Formed in 1949, NATO emerged from the western states, spearheaded by the US after Europe was drained from the repercussions of World War 2. This initiative was heavily dependent on US assistance and leadership to compensate for the military exhaustion and devastated economy rampant in Europe. Even today, Europe almost entirely depends on the US for military and technological capabilities, therefore, establishing a structure granting the United States a disproportionately influential role. The essential basis of this alliance reiterates and enforces an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all – disclosed under Article 5 of the treaty and remains central to its deterrence credibility.
This article did not however take into consideration conflicts between NATO members. This raises a broader question of how NATO would respond if cross border tensions were to emerge between its own members.
It is important to note that states have historically transferred territory through means of legal agreements, most notably the United States’ 1867 purchase of Alaska from Russia. Although NATO has no role in territorial sovereignty and the US offer to buy Greenland isn’t in violation of any NATO norms, provided it occurs with the consent of all relevant parties. The power asymmetries within the organisation are evident with the use of assertive rhetoric and alliance politics.
Despite its small size, Greenland is situated geographically at the GIUK gap – a critical point for monitoring Russian and Chinese sub marine movements from the Arctic into the North Atlantic which explains the political interests the US associates with the island. The US also operates the pituffick space base on the Island which serves as both a military base and a missile detection centre to counter any threats from Russia.
Donald Trump’s argument of needing to acquire Greenland to strengthen national security falls short in light to the 1951 defence of Greenland agreement which allows the US military access to build bases and station troops and even allows for the expansion of the troops if deemed necessary. The Danish government has also previously on every occasion agreed to establishment of US military bases within its borders to enforce security measures. Critics argue that given current agreements and absence of direct military threats, the national security justification remains contested.
Another outlook on this situation that stands, is the favourable geology advantage the island possesses. The high deposits of raw minerals in the island are somewhat of a safety net the US aims to procure to reduce its dependence on China and act as a deterrent to China’s world market control of 70% of the raw materials in current circulation. Timing of this proposition surprisingly coincides with adverse climate change conditions that are accelerating the melting of ice in an island where only 20% of the land is ice free. Major ice loss from the region hints at a ‘mineral gold rush’ making the region’s large reserves of untapped natural resources more accessible than ever.
Supporters of a stronger US global standing argue that Greenland’s strategic position is valuable from a safety standpoint and would extend US military reach to further support Trump’s proposed Arctic and North Atlantic missile defence initiative. As climate change alters access to the arctic region bringing forth more logistical challenges, this perspective aligns with the US argument of wanting to procure long term strategic defence and can be viewed as less of an immediate threat.
Nonetheless, strategic competition alone does not justify undermining alliance trust. NATO’s strength remains not only on its military capabilities and power structure but also is heavily reliant on mutual trust and restraint among alliance members. Such rhetoric, even if not followed through with, raises questions about precedence on NATO’s reliability and may complicate its perception on a global stage.
If NATO must remain credible, it must confront its structural weaknesses and preserve mutual respect.
The author is a Economics student at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Their academic interests focus on economic security, non-traditional security challenges, and the intersection of economics and geopolitics, with a particular interest in how economic policy shapes national and regional stability.
