Global Verification and the Demise of Covert Nuclear Testing
December 10, 2025
Lucky Azeem
The advent of hypersonic weapons has ignited a new debate about global security. Technology that can travel with blistering speed and manoeuvrability could overwhelm air defence systems, giving no time to verify if it is carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead. These are the key features of hypersonic weapons. Many countries continue to develop hypersonic systems amidst the eroding arms control frameworks.
Hypersonic weapons compress reaction time drastically, creating high risks of misinterpretation and accidental escalation.
The regulatory vacuum is especially alarming in regions like South Asia, which is home to two nuclear-armed rivals, India and Pakistan. India’s recent test of a long-range hypersonic missile and its development of new delivery systems signal a major strategic shift, compelling Pakistan to take countermeasures in line with its policy to maintain a credible deterrence vis-à-vis India.
Hypersonic weapons create a triple-layered danger. They are designed to travel at the speed of Mach 5, unlike traditional ballistic missiles that can reach hypersonic speeds during re-entry. Hypersonic glide vehicles, or hypersonic cruise missiles, stay hypersonic for most of their flights, reducing detection and reaction time drastically. Their speed helps them create a plasma sheath around them, leaving both infrared and optical sensors overwhelmed.
In addition, they fly in a radar blind zone and manoeuvre mid-flight, making it impossible for existing modern air defence systems to predict their path or intercept them. The ambiguity around their payloads, if conventional or nuclear, creates space for fatal misinterpretation. Such a combination of disruptive features not only threatens physical security but constrains the decision-making space that stability relies on.
The global landscape is already involved in the hypersonic weapons race. Major powers like the United States, China, and Russia have already developed and demonstrated hypersonic technology. The existing regulatory frameworks were mostly created in the context of the Cold War era, and are blind to disruptive features like manoeuvrability, speed, and payload ambiguity.
Existing global arms control frameworks fail to regulate manoeuvrable hypersonic systems or payload ambiguity.
The most comprehensive bilateral arms control framework in force, the New START, addresses launchers but does not exactly limit hypersonic glide vehicles or advanced cruise missiles. In addition to that, the treaty is limited to the US and Russia and is set to expire by February 2026, with prospects of its extension uncertain.
While frameworks such as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. Neither such frameworks cover hypersonic technology specifically nor are they legally binding. In addition, the geopolitical interests of major powers further weaken the existing mechanisms and hinder progress towards new arrangements.
India has also entered the race for hypersonic weapons. On July 16th,2025, India reportedly tested its most advanced hypersonic cruise missile under the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)’s project Vishnu. The missile is powered by an indigenously produced scramjet engine. The missile is reported to have a speed of Mach 8, approximately 11,000 km/h, and is designed to fly at low altitude with manoeuvrability and a highly accurate target.
It can be deployed from all air, sea, and land platforms with a dual capability of carrying conventional and nuclear payloads. India began its hypersonic development back in 2008 with the missile Shurya, which then reached a speed of Mach 7.5. It was the fundamental for India’s manoeuvrable technology. Later in 2020, India produced the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) at a speed of Mach 5.9 at an altitude of 30km.
India also has a flight trial due in 2027, in collaboration with Russia (BrahMos-2), expected to reach a speed of Mach 8 over 1,000-15,00 km. Furthermore, India is developing hypersonic drones such as the RHH-150, with the capacity to reach a speed of Mach 10 and mid-flight directional agility, highly capable of completely reshaping the regional dynamics.
These developments suggest broader doctrinal shifts and new patterns of Indian military strategy. India intends to carry out faster, highly accurate strikes, leaving Pakistan with less or no time to react. In the recent conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025, India’s pattern seemed to be focusing on the destruction of Pakistan’s Air defense first, followed by drone sensors and missiles to find targets, and strike immediately.
However, India lost several of its aircraft, encouraging a shift towards another pattern with India mirroring Israel’s pattern of attacks during the Iran-Israel five-day war in July. Its recent tests of hypersonic missiles appear to be part of its strategy to undermine Pakistan’s capability to retaliate before it can fully mobilize.
Currently, the crisis communication between the states is extremely weak, with no reliable crisis management mechanisms, missile pre-notification agreements on cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. External help, such as the US, is not to be completely relied on. During the recent crisis in May 2025, the US hesitated first, but when it finally helped de-escalate, the existing Indian government faced criticism from the public for ‘surrendering to the US’.
South Asia lacks crisis communication and missile pre-notification mechanisms, increasing the danger of catastrophic miscalculation.
This suggests that future Indian governments may be hesitant to accept US intervention next time any crisis escalates. To conclude, the hypersonic development is way ahead of the diplomacy, and South Asia is low on time to build the coping mechanisms it desperately needs. If the world fails to upgrade arms control frameworks, modify existing transparency and notification arrangements, South Asia might face catastrophic outcomes not only because of intent but also miscalculations and accidents.
However, to prevent escalations, the neighbours urgently need to set practical and politically realistic confidence-building measures, bilateral or regional mechanisms. Lastly, Pakistan should continue to reinforce a minimum credible deterrent posture focused on an assured response.
The author is an International Relations graduate from Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Sciences at Quetta. She is also an emerging research intern at the Balochistan Think Tank Network. Her work explores human security, nuclear energy, climate justice, and the strategic impacts of modern warfare technologies.
