Nuclear Black Market: A Global Security Threat

Harsa Kakar

Nuclear theft in India is not a new occurrence. The country has been facing this alarming situation for so many decades now. This has become a serious threat to the security of India and even South Asia, not to mention the entire globe.

The black market smuggling of uranium brokering, smuggling of highly radioactive substances like Californium, are all vintage examples, and the problem is ever-increasing in India. Insufficiencies in the protection of fissile materials will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and will increase the chances of nuclear terrorism, which will be catastrophic in terms of the security of the whole region and the global one.

India’s nuclear security ranked low globally, with no independent regulatory body ensuring effective oversight.

Then in August 2024, Indian police in Gopalganj district of the state of Bihar seized 50 grams of Californium, an extremely radioactive element, valued on the black market by some estimates at 100 million. It was not the only incident. There have also been reports of theft of more than 200 kilograms of nuclear and radioactive material, which dates as far back as the 1990s. Indian police seized over 13 kilograms of uranium in two separate operations in May and June 2021 in the states of Maharashtra and Jharkhand.

In July 2024, a radioactive device at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center was stolen, and five people were arrested in the city of Dehradun. Such incidents indicate vices within the Indian nuclear security systems that include a lack of patrols, inside jobs, and weak regulation procedures. The same has been displayed in the histogram below.

India is the ninth major uranium producer globally and a large importer of uranium. The theft of the most radioactive element in the nuclear program puts the whole system in a threatening situation. Similarly, the Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative 2020 placed India at an index of 0.54 (rank 20 out of 22 countries) in securing nuclear materials, compared to Pakistan, which was noted to have improved the most in this sector. The fact that there is no independent nuclear regulation organization means that the problem is further enhanced since India has its Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reporting to the Department of Atomic Energy, thus compromising its independence and efficacy.

What is more alarming is the existence of non-state terrorist groups and their potential reach to this nuclear black market. It is to be noted that Natural uranium, which is commonly confiscated in these events, cannot be directly applied in the production of nuclear weapons unless it is greatly enriched, but can be used with conventional explosives to form a so-called dirty bomb.

Theft of radioactive materials like Californium poses a grave threat of nuclear terrorism and dirty bombs.

This type of device would lead to mass panic, pollution of the environment, and loss of life on a huge scale. The risk is increased by the strategic competition between India and Pakistan and also by the dynamics of tensions in South Asia. The Foreign Office of Pakistan has been saying this several times since stolen materials may fall into the hands of non-state actors across the border, leading, perhaps, to a larger conflict. China has also raised its concerns over the regional repercussions of the Indian nuclear security breach.

This is worrying that the international community does not raise a lot of voices against such incidents. Additionally, India’s receiving the waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008 has facilitated India’s access to the world Uranium market and nuclear trade without adequate accountability, even though it is not a signatory to the NPT. There is no transparency since security breaches in India are often not reported in the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) by the IAEA.

Such silence is potentially dangerous and may even justify repeated lapses in India since it is liable to render the international non-proliferation campaign dysfunctional. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) offer strict control, but India is dubious about complying with such provisions.  For instance, a huge cybersecurity risk was highlighted by the 2019 cyberattack on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, where the national nuclear infrastructure was proven to be addressing security risks not only on the physical level.

International silence and India’s NSG waiver contribute to persistent security lapses and global risks.

To reduce such risks, India needs to revamp its nuclear security system. Setting up of an independent regulatory authority, in line with the IAEA declaration, and enhancing the system of material accounting are important measures. India should be held responsible by the international community, especially the NSG and the IAEA, by restricting its use of nuclear trade unless better security measures are taken at least. Tensions and nuclear security could be alleviated through regional cooperation, including confidence-building measures such as the Strategic Restraint Regime that has been proposed by Pakistan.

The author is an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta.