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Dr. Marriyam Siddique
The formal recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by Russia is a moment steeped in historical irony and contemporary contradiction. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan provided fertile ground for the jihadist groups that would eventually become the Taliban, whose ideological progeny currently hold control in Kabul. The legacy is far more complicated and expensive for Pakistan, which once rejoiced over the Taliban’s takeover as a strategic success. Since the Afghan-Soviet war, terrorist networks that thrived there have spread, endangering Pakistan’s security and stability. The Taliban’s regional vision is inherently rooted in Afghanistan’s difficult history and poses a threat to its neighbours – their actions do little to alleviate this menace.
Russia’s recognition boosts Taliban legitimacy but won’t pressure them to curb terrorist proxies like TTP.
Russia acted quite pragmatically while recognising the Taliban. To resist Western domination and ensure its own peripheral influence, Moscow aspires to enhance its influence in Central and South Asia. Economic considerations are impending as well; Russia wants to bolster its position as an economic powerhouse in the region by increasing its trade with Afghanistan, especially in the energy, transportation, and infrastructure sectors. However, for all its symbolism, it is unlikely to interpret this recognition into consequential leverage over the Taliban, particularly on the critical matter of terrorism. Moscow has far less strategic prominence in Afghanistan than in Syria or Iran, and even Russian officials admit that the Taliban are untrustworthy allies.
It is, to put it mildly, naive to contemplate that the Taliban’s actions or cross-border terrorism could be influenced by Russian recognition. The Taliban, so far, have not demonstrated any desire to cut relations with non-state terrorist actors such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which continuously orchestrates terrorist attacks on Pakistan. The Taliban seems to control these terrorist actors and uses them as proxies to pressure Islamabad while denying responsibility. The persistent danger presented by terrorist networks based in Afghanistan is highlighted by the recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s border districts, which includes suicide bombings and targeted killings. Russia’s recognition could actually strengthen the Taliban, since it gives them worldwide legitimacy without really pressuring them to change their approach towards terrorism.
At the same time, China is dealing with its dilemmas. Beijing, an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan and a global power, has the greatest interest in seeing the nation remain stable. The security and sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments and the possible spread of terrorism into western Xinjiang are China’s topmost urgencies. China is hesitant to formally recognise the Taliban’s government because it fears legitimising a regime that is both internationally isolated and internally oppressive. However, China has dealt with the Taliban pragmatically by providing economic incentives and diplomatic engagement. While Russia’s move could put further pressure on Beijing to do the same, it also creates new rivalries for power in Kabul. Moscow will benefit if Russia maintains its political and economic influence in Afghanistan.
The Taliban continue to use terrorist groups to exert regional influence, undermining stability.
When asked if Russian recognition will reduce terrorism, more pessimism than hope is heard. Given their previous behaviour, the Taliban appear to prefer managing terrorist groups rather than eliminating them. This tendency to provide shelter to outsiders is induced by their ideology and culture. Additionally, their will to use proxies to exert regional influence is unwavering, and tangible field operations are unlikely to back up their assurances to Russia, China, or Pakistan. The present situation, in which terrorism and instability continue beyond national borders, could be prolonged if diplomatic relations are established with a regime that has not changed its approach towards militancy.
Unsettling questions arise regarding the political behaviour of regimes that adhere to and are unwilling to change their problematic behaviour. Russia’s recognition may encourage other states to follow suit, motivated less by sincere conviction and more by geopolitical or economic self-interests. The menace here is that other terrorist groups may see the recognition as a model for how to acquire power by force, and they may try to earn acceptance from influential governments by demonstrating how expedient they are to those states.
Pakistan needs to rethink its strategy towards Afghanistan in light of these shifting factors. Will Islamabad be able to find fresh ways to put pressure on the Taliban to control anti-Pakistan terrorists, or will it have to accept the new normal of constant border insecurity? What steps may Pakistan take to protect its interests in Central Asia against additional retaliation from Kabul? Above all else, is the risky game of proxies and plausible deniability necessary to achieve regional stability? Most significantly, the real test for Russia will be how influential it will be towards the Taliban, especially in the context of containing cross-terrorism, which is the real cause of concern towards regional peace and stability.
China hesitates to formally recognize the Taliban but engages pragmatically to protect its interests.
The questions are just as important for China as well. Is Beijing going to officially recognise the Taliban? To safeguard its western frontier and commercial interests, can China avoid becoming caught up in the internal turmoil of Afghanistan? China, recently, attempted to bridge the political void between Pakistan and Afghanistan to foster reconciliation. However, cross-border terrorism remains a serious concern for Pakistan.
The region is in a state of flux, with old alliances eroding and new calculations being made; Russia’s recognition of the Taliban is more of a symptom than a cure. The realistic and merciless calculation of interests and imperatives drives statecraft in this region. However, the lasting lesson from Afghanistan is that power manoeuvres and proxies only provide temporary benefits. Discovering a path beyond pragmatic politics and towards a future free from the aspirations of armed factions or the fickle dictates of faraway capitals is the true test for Pakistan, China, and the rest of the region.
Senior Research Fellow, Maritime Centre of Excellence, Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore. She can be reached at drmarriyam16@gmail.com.
