Kira Shamsutdinova
According to the Jamestown Foundation, The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company, in December 2025, reached an agreement on financing a railway that was initially planned back in 1997 for $4.7 billion. China would be responsible for almost half of the financing by way of a 35-year loan.
The joint venture would be 51 percent owned by China. From the perspective of the double landlocked nation that has struggled to find itself outside of geographical isolation ever since the Soviet era, this could well be the most important infrastructure project in generations – or the price of connectivity may be a new form of dependency. It is the very heart of the matter for Uzbekistan and its relationship with the Silk Routes that are being developed in the region as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This is because Uzbekistan, a country whose exports must pass through other countries in order to be shipped anywhere, cannot afford to view the infrastructure projects of the BRI as mere geopolitics. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev understood this when he took power in 2016, and Uzbekistan has since become one of the most eager of the Central Asian participants in the BRI.
There is no doubt that this opportunity’s importance cannot be overstated. According to the OECD, freight traffic through the Middle Corridor – a connection between China, Central Asia, and Europe through the Caspian Sea that goes around Russia – increased sevenfold, growing from 800,000 tons in 2021 to 4.5 million tons in 2024.
After being built, the CKU railway is expected to carry 10 to 15 million tons of freight each year and earn annual transit revenues of $150 to $200 million for Uzbekistan, according to a 2026 SAGE journal study on Uzbekistan’s BRI engagement. It will also shorten transit times from China to Europe by seven to eight days compared to current routes.
In addition to bringing railroad development, Chinese companies’ investments in Uzbekistan have generated significant industrial activity in recent years. In the auto industry, China has moved into the market with huge speed, setting up joint ventures, brand deals, and other arrangements that have produced actual jobs and industrial capabilities.
This pattern is common in BRI countries: investments enter quickly, bring Chinese technology and logistics, and focus on industries that ensure economic ties going forward. For a nation that requires investment and development, this is an actual advantage.
However, the structural reality looks different. Chinese exports to Uzbekistan grew from $3.94 billion in 2018 to $12.7 billion in 2023, representing a more than threefold increase. Uzbekistan’s exports to China, though, have fallen, dropping from $2.24 billion to $1.82 billion during the same time frame.
In addition, China became Uzbekistan’s top creditor state, with claims of about $4 billion. CKU rail underscores this unevenness in that the project was primarily financed by Chinese state-owned banks, is owned mostly by China, and aims to serve China’s ambitions in the region.
A similar pattern can be observed in other sectors. The Bash-Dzhankeldy wind power plant – the largest wind power plant in Central Asia with an output of one gigawatt – in Bukhara was constructed by China Energy Engineering Group and funded partly through loans provided by European development banks under the control of a Saudi developer.
A question arises: who benefits from the deal? Chinese state companies get the contract and control; the European development banks finance it; and Uzbekistan provides its land and policies. The branding is multilateral; the economic weight is Chinese.
Tashkent is not unaware of this dynamic. In the first EU-Central Asia Summit organized in Samarkand in April 2025, the European Union unveiled a €12 billion Global Gateway package of investments for Central Asia. There have been commitments for €10 billion to fund the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor since January 2024. Moreover, Uzbekistan continues to make efforts to become a member of the World Trade Organization.
While there are risks involved in the creation of the New Silk Roads, there are also opportunities presented to Tashkent by such projects. As a matter of fact, a railway line is just that, a railway. What matters is whether Tashkent will be able to take advantage of the connectivity offered in order to diversify trade and increase competition among potential investors in order to reduce the trade deficit with China.
Back in time, it was the Silk Road that allowed Samarkand to become one of the most prosperous cities in the world. The modern version of it offers Uzbekistan the same opportunity. The thing is, the conditions now come with loan agreements, not caravans of camels.
