Izza Khawar
The prevailing civil war in Yemen has transformed from a proxy conflict against Iran-aligned Houthi militants into a direct confrontation between two major Gulf nations, i.e., the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were formal allies in the coalition led by Saudi Arabia that intervened in Yemen in 2015, but they are now openly at war over tactics, local proxies, and Yemen’s political fate. This growing schism has not only complicated the chance for a political solution in Yemen (one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies) but also marked a broader geopolitical junction for the Middle Eastern regional order.
At its core, the ongoing conflict reflects opposing geopolitical perspectives. The KSA insists on maintaining Yemen’s territorial integrity under a centralised state that aligns with Riyadh’s strategic goals, particularly along the country’s southern border. Conversely, the UAE actively supports the Southern Transitional Council (STC) (a separatist organisation seeking autonomy for southern Yemen), seeing it as a way to secure important maritime ports and exert influence over the trade routes of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These opposing goals have now changed into open conflict between the two, threatening to destabilise the frail coalition against the Houthis.
Yemen’s civil war started with the Saudi-UAE-backed and internationally recognised authority against the Iran-backed Houthis, who govern a significant portion of northern Yemen and the city of Sanaa. However, the coalition, over time, sought different strategies. Saudi Arabia’s objective of bolstering the Yemeni state and reducing Houthi influence, whereas the UAE’s purpose is to expand its area of influence by enabling the STC. This strategic divide has finally reached an end.
The core point of this article is that the Saudi-UAE conflict in Yemen symbolises deeper geopolitical competition, threatening both Yemen’s rebuilding potential and Gulf stability as a whole. Yemen’s crisis will likely remain in a stalemate, encouraging extremist organisations, worsening civilian hardship, and enabling regional rivals to exploit the anti-Houthi alliance unless these two powerhouses reach an agreement.
To illustrate the timeline, in late 2025, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on the port city of Mukalla after stating that a consignment of weaponry bound for the UAE-backed STC had landed via Emirati ports. Riyadh considered this a breach of cooperation and an immediate threat to its security posture. In response to this incident, the UAE declared the withdrawal of its troops from Yemen, citing security concerns following the event.
The consequences have been reckless. First, Saudi authorities directed the UAE to withdraw all soldiers within 24 hours. Next, by establishing a state of emergency in southern Yemen and launching counteroffensives against STC locations, the KSA retook Aden and the neighbouring provinces. As a result, the STC’s previous military triumphs, especially in Hadhramaut and al-Mahra, key areas of maritime and economic status, were reversed by Saudi-backed operations.
This skirmish has also worsened internal divisions among Yemeni factions. Subsequently, the long-time head of the STC, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, fled Yemen after being accused of treason by the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council. Similarly, riots in Aden and southern cities broke out, revealing local dissatisfaction with Riyadh’s stance.
While surface narratives focus on tactical conflicts, the conflict in Yemen indicates underlying fractures in broader Gulf politics. Firstly, the conflict reveals a disparity in strategic doctrines, i.e., Riyadh’s traditional emphasis on centralised authority vs Abu Dhabi’s inclination for decentralised, proxy-backed rule. The latter plan seeks to establish loyal local allies in charge of key trade routes and ports, an estimate influenced by the UAE’s larger marine and economic goals.
Secondly, the split has hindered diplomatic progress. Analysts have warned that the Saudi-UAE feud will encourage both the Houthis and other foreign actors (particularly Iran) to capitalise on the divisions. Such conflicting Gulf politics weaken peace talks and give actors like the Houthis power, allowing them to postpone commitments. Third, the skirmish has important policy consequences for Western and regional parties.
The United States and its European partners, who have already advocated for a political settlement and humanitarian gateway, now face a complex diplomatic terrain. Additionally, increased Gulf competitiveness threatens the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) unity, with possible costs in other theatres like the Horn of Africa. Libya or Sudan.
The Saudi-UAE skirmish in Yemen is about more than just tactics. It represents a regional strategic dilemma. As two of the region’s influential forces clash over Yemen’s future, the possibilities for long-term peace in Yemen become progressively distant.
For policymakers, this highlights the critical need for rebalancing diplomatic relations, prioritising a comprehensive Yemeni ownership of the peace process, and driving Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to align their strategic assessments. Without such initiatives, Yemen may remain trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and rivalry, with catastrophic humanitarian and geopolitical consequences that spread far beyond its borders.
The author is a graduate of MS Strategic Studies from the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Her academic focus centres on Middle Eastern politics and security dynamics, with particular emphasis on contemporary conflicts and regional power rivalries.
