Amna Mukhtar
The rapid advancement in internet connectivity of everyday technologies promises convenience and efficiency, and yet, it can be costly. During October and November, the commercial refrigeration systems in several European countries faced cyber-attacks. These separate attacks caused a rise in temperatures in supermarket fridges and freezers, forcing retailers to discard food and eventually disrupting food logistics. This scourge of cyberattacks isn’t restricted to supermarkets alone, as on 2 November, a cyberattack on France’s national blood service impacted cold-storage systems at the three regional facilities.
It has always been assumed that owning something means controlling it. Once a consumer purchases a car, refrigerator or other product, they expect that they own it and can use it within the limits of the law. Connected technology complicates this relationship. Currently, the functionality of physical products rests on software, remote servers and manufacturer-controlled frameworks. This is creating a situation in which ownership may exist in legal terms, while applied control is remaining elsewhere, in many respects.
A 2020 incident of a second-hand Tesla Model S shows this tension. A customer discovered that its Autopilot Driver Assist and Full Self-Driving features, reportedly worth roughly $8,000, had disappeared shortly following a software update, after the purchase of vehicle. Tesla claimed that the new buyer had not purchased the software despite the features having been listed on the vehicle.
Even as this is one case and doesn’t establish a broad industry practice, it showed how a manufacturer could change the functionality of a product after it had changed hands. The issue wasn’t simply about the removal of a software feature. It was the uncertainty surrounding what ownership actually guarantees when a manufacturer keeps remote control.
This isn’t to suggest that remote access is inherently problematic. In fact, it can offer considerable benefits. Connected vehicle systems can help recover stolen cars, improve road safety and allow manufacturers to address software defects without requiring physical recalls. In 2023, Tesla owner Nick Kyrgios used the company’s mobile application to track his stolen Model X and limit its speed to 80km/h while assisting police.
Similarly, General Motors’ OnStar system provides a vehicle slowdown service, but its use is subject to police confirmation that conditions are appropriate. These safeguards show that remote intervention can serve a legitimate public interest when its use is governed by clear procedures.
The roadblock therefore isn’t the technology itself, but the absence of transparent policies regulating its use. What notification must an owner receive? Under what circumstances can a manufacturer restrict a product’s functionality? Who can begin a remote intervention? What pathways of appeal or redress are available when an intervention is unjustified? Without clear answers, the same technology that’s allowing an owner to recover a stolen vehicle can also leave that owner dependent on decisions made by a manufacturer or service provider, in various situations.
Some protection is being offered by existing regulatory frameworks, but significant gaps remain. Indeed, the European Union’s Data Act, which has applied since September 2025, is strengthening users’ rights to access data created by connected products. Its rules also introduce needs for data accessibility by design requirements for products placed on the market after September 2026. Data access isn’t the same as control over a product. Over the software functions that are determining how it operates, the ability to retrieve information made by a device doesn’t necessarily give its owner authority.
The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) takes another step by requiring manufacturers to tackle vulnerabilities during a product’s support period, which must generally be at least five years or reflect a shorter projected period of use, however article 2(2)(c) is excluding products covered by the EU’s Motor Vehicle General Safety Regulation from its scope.
The distinction matters. While, connected products such as refrigeration systems fall within the broader cybersecurity framework, vehicles are governed by separate sector-specific rules. The finding is a regulatory area in which cybersecurity obligations exist, but a uniform legal standard for ownership and remote control remains less clearly established.
The United States has also addressed connected vehicle security, through the restrictions on particular software and hardware linked to China and Russia, with bans taking effect for prescribed model years from 2027 and 2030, respectively. While these measures are tackling legitimate national security concerns, they don’t solve the separate question of how manufacturers should exercise remote authority over vehicles owned by consumers, to a significant degree. Certainly, the debate shouldn’t be restricted to who controls the technology from abroad but should also consider who is accountable for controlling it at home.
A clearer understanding of ownership in the digital era is needed by connected products. Governments should establish legal protects regulating remote disablement and revision, covering recommended grounds for intervention, transparent notification requirements, autonomous oversight and accessible processes for fixing, among other things. They should also consider minimum, clearly disclosed cybersecurity support periods for connected vehicles, aligned with the expected useful life of the product.
Connectivity should likely make products safer, more efficient and easier to uphold, not make ownership increasingly conditional on the whole. A consumer who is buying a connected car shouldn’t have to question whether a feature can disappear without explanation, just as a business shouldn’t be left operating equipment whose security support has quietly expired. What we need to ask is no longer simply who owns the product, and who holds the off switch. And who answers when it’s employed.
Amna Mukhtar is an early-career International Relations professional interested in how technology, politics, and security shape global affairs. Her research interests include arms control, emerging technologies, human security, and the role of policy in addressing contemporary challenges.




