Global Verification and the Demise of Covert Nuclear Testing

Nazia Sheikh

CTBT prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions, but has not been legally implemented yet. Its strength is based on its legal and moral weight and its verification regime, which is aimed at identifying any nuclear detonation anywhere on Earth, whether underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere. The CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS) spans 89 countries, comprising 337 facilities, 21 monitoring stations, and 16 radionuclide laboratories. 90 percent of its facilities are already operational, creating one of the most refined verification systems in the world.

The CTBT’s International Monitoring System detects any nuclear explosion using seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide technologies.

The IMS facilities constantly keep an eye out for any indications of a nuclear explosion as the system uses four complementary verification techniques, including Seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound stations that monitor the atmosphere, oceans, and subsurface, respectively, while radioactive debris from underwater or atmospheric nuclear explosions or noble gases from subterranean explosions are detected by radionuclide stations. Collected data from these stations is transmitted quickly to the International Data Centre (IDC) at the CTBTO headquarters in Vienna. Confirming that no nuclear activity remains undetected, the IDC analyzed the data before sharing results with member states. The CTBTO maintains a powerful norm against nuclear explosions by establishing international cooperation and technological accuracy.

The efficiency of the CTBTO’s monitoring network has been repeatedly proven, as exemplified by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). North Korea conducted 6 nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and once in 2017. The CTBTO’s monitoring stations detected the tests with reliability and precision in every case. The CTBTO shared automatic analyses with the member states within two hours, describing the location, times, and magnitude of the tests. A nuclear explosion cannot be done covertly or openly, as the advanced technology and verification are the ultimate truth.

The DPRK’s case demonstrates that even a controlled and highly isolated state cannot cover such an episode from the international scientific community, as the detection is now a matter of minutes, not days. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and satellite-based surveillance strengthen the CTBTO’s system. Universities, non-governmental organisations, and independent analysts can get data from commercial corporations such as Planet Labs and Maxar. Results that were once the sole purview of governments are now verified and made public by civil society organisations and academic institutions. It is now practically impossible for a “secret” test to avoid notice in this transparent setting.

North Korea’s nuclear tests proved the system’s precision, with detections and analyses shared within hours.

The political, financial, and strategic consequences would be unaffordable, even if a state tried a covert test. The CTBT has strengthened the international rule against nuclear testing, making it almost universal. States would suffer immediate diplomatic and international reputation damage if found in violation of the CTBT. The example is North Korea, whose nuclear testing led to multiple series of sanctions, isolation, and an international consensus strengthened on non-proliferation. Nuclear-armed nations that are parties to the CTBT or not realized that conducting a nuclear test would destabilize the world and cause anger against this state worldwide.

For non-NPT nuclear-armed nations like India and Pakistan, whose last tests were conducted in 1998, restraint is a national duty for both states. The delicate equilibrium in South Asia would be upset, and more tests would compromise diplomatic reputation. The continuation of the testing moratorium in the case of the recognized nuclear powers, the US, UK, Russia, China, and France, reflects both technological confidence and political caution in preserving arsenals through simulation and subcritical experiments as opposed to live detonations.

OSINT and commercial satellites make covert nuclear testing virtually impossible.

A nuclear test cannot be hidden in the interconnected, data-driven world of today, not from satellites, sensors, or the worldwide community. This change is demonstrated by the CTBT’s International Monitoring System, a worldwide network that makes sure that testing ban violations are found, examined, and made public. Clandestine nuclear testing is no longer an option, and any attempt to challenge this fact would be quickly discovered and condemned internationally rather than being regarded with astonishment. The combination of transparency, diplomacy, and science has made nuclear secrecy a myth. No nuclear explosion, no matter how tiny or distant, can evade the world’s collective attention.

The author  is a Research Officer at Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. She is an MPhil scholar in international relations from international Islamic university Islamabad.