Nazia Sheikh
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on 5 February 2026. This expiration marked the first time since the early 1970s that there would be no other agreement under negotiation to legally bind the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. The world would become a more dangerous place as moving away from nuclear restraint by the great powers.
The treaty served as a final guardrail to limit the nuclear competition between the two largest nuclear-armed states, and the loss of this treaty is to lose the verification and behavioral constraints that limit the nuclear competition. According to some sources, the U.S. and Russia want to continue to observe the New START as it has formally expired, but there is no legal provision for extension in the treaty. According to U.S officials, nothing would be official until Trump and Putin formally approved.
In 2010, New START was signed between President Medvedev and President Obama. The treaty limits the 1550 deployed strategic warheads of Russia and China, 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers, 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and also initiated a comprehensive verification and transparency mechanism with notifications, data exchange, and on-site inspections. The treaty was designed on the pattern of the agreements which was signed during cold war era to limit nuclear weapons.
New START was initiated for 10 years from 2011 to 2021, with a single five-year extension of five years and no more extensions allowed in the provisions. Putin announced the suspension of the new START in February 2023 following the US support for Ukraine. In retaliation, the US also put an end to mutual data exchange and inspection visits that were part of new START treaty. However, both sides adhere to the treaty core values, and there has been no major breach in the use of nuclear weapons. The expiry of the treaty has removed the last mutually agreed framework which limit the largest nuclear arsenals in the world.
Putin proposed a one-year extension of the new START in September 2025. Though at that time, Trump appreciated the one-year extension as proposed by Russia, no official negotiations took place. Moscow also indicated that there is no official development from the US government to discuss the extension further. As Trump already hinted, a better agreement would be negotiated with China’s inclusion in the New START. While China is reluctant to join the arms control negotiations, as its nuclear arsenals are lesser than that of Russia and the US.
The US plans to increase its advance missiles technology, under the Golden Dome, which will further complicate the strategic landscape. Moscow’s limits on nuclear weapons are linked to the US. A rapid increase in nuclear weapons will prompt Russia to increase its nuclear weapons, further intensifying the arms race. Negotiating a treaty from scratch will need more time to implement; rather than an extension of one year in New START will be a possible option, but without verification, it is inadequate.
The US public opinion runs contrary to the new START expiration. A poll released in January, initiated by Nuclear Threat Initiative, that including 85 %President Trump, found that overall 91 % Americans believe that the US should negotiate a new treaty with Moscow to maintain current nuclear weapons, or both states should minimize their nuclear arsenals.
Until the progress for new negotiations took place, some methods can reduce the risk of nuclear escalation between the two states, like risk reduction talks, military-to-military hotlines, and an informal transparency approach. Voluntary transparency and unilateral restraint can work for some time until both governments explore new forums for multilateral talks.
A timely requirement to engage in constructive dialogues for the US and Russia, along with reducing their nuclear weapons, which are 85% of the world’s warheads, and to manage the nuclear risk, arms race, and strategic stability for a safer world.
The author is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. She holds an MPhil degree in International Relations from the International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at nsheikh536@gmail.com
