Mohammad Zain
President Donald J. Trump paid a state visit to China along with his cabinet members and a business delegation. This high-level summit between two structurally competing great powers took place from 13th to 15th May 2026. The visit was significant for several reasons, including prospects for economic cooperation and key political issues.
The United States’ attempts to reduce its military and political entanglements in the Middle East, along with rising tensions over Taiwan, were widely identified by analysts as key strategic issues shaping the summit agenda. According to Xi Jinping’s opening remarks, however, the deeper concern was the logic of great-power transition. Xi referred to Thucydides’ account in The History of the Peloponnesian War, where the rise of Sparta challenged the established dominance of Athens. In international relations theory, this reading has come to be known as the “Thucydides Trap,” a framework suggesting that structural tension between a rising and an established power increases the risk of conflict. Xi remarked, “Can China and the United States transcend the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’ and forge a new paradigm for major-power relations?”
The Thucydides Trap is a concept derived from Thucydides’ work The History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he describes the dynamics that led to war between Athens and Sparta. As per modern international relations theory, the idea explains how conflict may become more likely when a rising power challenges an established dominant power. The key elements in this interpretation include a growing security dilemma, mutual mistrust, and structural power transition. In such situations, the rising power often seeks to revise or reshape aspects of the international order in line with its interests, while the established power seeks to preserve its existing position of dominance. According to this framework, it is the interaction between rising and ruling powers, under conditions of mistrust and shifting capabilities, that can increase the risk of major-power conflict.
Xi Jinping’s reference to Thucydides can be interpreted as highlighting the structural dynamics of power transition in international relations, where a rising power and an established power may enter into strategic tension. As analysts have noted, such references reflect the perception of China’s continued rise and the relative adjustment of US global influence within an evolving multipolar order. The concept of the Thucydides Trap has also been discussed in US strategic discourse, particularly in policy debates surrounding Asia-Pacific strategy during the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” and in more confrontational interpretations of US–China relations by figures such as Steve Bannon. In this sense, Xi’s invocation can be read less as a direct warning and more as a strategic reminder of the risks of mismanaged power transitions and the importance of avoiding great-power conflict.
The Taiwan issue remains one of the most sensitive and enduring flashpoints in US–China relations. According to China’s One China Principle, Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese sovereign territory, and Beijing maintains that both sides of the strait belong to a single China despite their political separation since 1949. The United States, while officially adhering to a policy of strategic ambiguity, does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state. It nevertheless maintains unofficial relations and continues arms sales under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act, while opposing any unilateral change to the status quo.
For China, reunification is tied to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national rejuvenation. For the United States, Taiwan occupies a critical position within the first island chain and plays an important role in maintaining regional balance and deterrence architecture in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, any attempt by China to alter the status quo through force would significantly reshape regional power projection dynamics, while continued US military support to Taiwan sustains deterrence but also perpetuates strategic mistrust.
In this context, the Taiwan question is often interpreted within broader debates on power transition and the Thucydides Trap, not as a deterministic pathway to conflict but as a structural condition in which miscalculation between a rising and an established power can increase the risk of escalation.
In conclusion, the Taiwan question and the broader trajectory of US–China relations cannot be understood through deterministic frameworks alone. They reflect the structural pressures highlighted in the Thucydides Trap debate. The interaction between a rising China and an established United States is shaped by material shifts in power, competing narratives, historical memory, and strategic perception. Taiwan functions as both a geopolitical pivot and a symbolic fault line where sovereignty, deterrence, and regional order intersect.
The logic of power transition suggests heightened risk, but it does not predetermine conflict. The outcome depends on the ability of both sides to manage mistrust, avoid miscalculation, and construct mechanisms of coexistence within an increasingly contested international order. The Thucydides Trap therefore operates less as a prophecy of war and more as a warning about the consequences of unmanaged structural change. US–China relations will evolve toward confrontation or controlled competition depending on political will, strategic restraint, and the capacity to sustain dialogue in the face of deepening rivalry.
The author is a researcher with academic backgrounds in English Literature, Linguistics, and International Relations from NUML University. His work focuses on geopolitics, strategic affairs, political philosophy, space governance, and emerging global power dynamics. He writes analytical and narrative-driven opinion pieces that combine historical insight with contemporary international affairs. He is also an educator and co-founder of a local youth welfare organization
