Ulzira Baxitbaeva
For decades, Germany’s foreign policy was shaped by economic interdependence, European integration, and a cautious approach to military power. After the Second World War, Berlin deliberately avoided acting as a traditional great power and instead relied heavily on the European Union, NATO, and its partnership with the United States. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally challenged this model. Germany is now being pushed toward a more active and strategically responsible foreign policy. The central question is no longer whether Germany should play a greater international role, but how it can do so without undermining European unity or its commitment to diplomacy.
The most important turning point has been the concept of Zeitenwende, or “watershed,” announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Germany subsequently adopted its first National Security Strategy in 2023, defining security more broadly than military defence. The strategy emphasizes resilience, defence capabilities, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, supply chains, and protection against disinformation. This represents a significant departure from the assumption that economic cooperation and diplomacy alone could guarantee European stability.
Germany’s response to Russia demonstrates this transformation most clearly. Berlin has become one of Ukraine’s most important European supporters while strengthening its commitment to NATO. This shift reflects a recognition that European security cannot be separated from Germany’s own national interests. At the same time, Germany must balance military support with diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable peace. A foreign policy based only on military power would contradict Germany’s post-war political tradition, while a policy based only on diplomacy could weaken deterrence. The challenge is therefore to combine credible defence with sustained diplomatic engagement.
Germany’s role within Europe is equally important. As the European Union’s largest economy, Germany has significant influence over the direction of European policy. Yet greater influence also creates greater responsibility. Germany cannot pursue national security priorities independently of its European partners, particularly France, Poland, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A stronger German foreign policy should therefore be European rather than purely national. Cooperation in defence, energy security, sanctions policy, and support for Ukraine can strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy while maintaining the transatlantic relationship.
Another major challenge is Germany’s relationship with China. For years, German economic prosperity benefited from close commercial ties with the Chinese market. However, growing geopolitical competition and concerns about economic dependence have forced Berlin to reconsider this relationship. Germany’s 2023 China Strategy describes China simultaneously as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. It calls for continued cooperation while reducing vulnerabilities and protecting Germany’s economic and political interests.
This approach is more realistic than either complete confrontation or unrestricted economic engagement. Germany’s soft stance on China also risks undermining relations with the United States, which remains its most important ally. This risk was highlighted when Friedrich Merz recently called for a trade agreement between the EU and China. Shortly thereafter, he criticized the United States for its “social climate” and stated that he would not advise his children to move there.
Merz has recently been at odds with Donald Trump, which likely explains his comments. Germany may see China as a growth market, but it benefits far more from the United States. This is, of course, most obvious in the defense sphere, where the still-weak German armed forces are bolstered by the might of the American military and US security guarantee and America remains Germany’s largest export market.
Germany’s future foreign policy should therefore focus on diversification rather than isolation. Reducing strategic dependence on individual countries is increasingly important in an international system characterized by geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, and supply-chain disruptions. Germany can pursue this through stronger relations with European partners, democratic states in the Indo-Pacific, and emerging economies. Such diversification would protect German economic interests while giving Berlin greater diplomatic flexibility.
Nevertheless, Germany faces a difficult domestic challenge: translating strategic ambitions into sustainable policies. Increasing defence spending, supporting Ukraine, strengthening European security, and maintaining economic competitiveness require substantial financial resources. Public support for these policies cannot be assumed indefinitely. The government must therefore explain clearly why international security is directly connected to domestic prosperity, energy security, technological resilience, and democratic stability.
Germany’s greatest foreign-policy opportunity lies in using its economic and political weight to strengthen Europe as a whole. If Berlin can combine national interests with European solidarity, maintain a constructive transatlantic relationship, manage its economic ties with China more carefully, and support a secure and sovereign Ukraine, it can become a more effective international actor without abandoning its post-war commitment to cooperation and peace. The future of Germany’s foreign policy should therefore not be about choosing between diplomacy and power, but about developing the capacity to use both responsibly.
Ulzira Baxitbaeva -is an intern at PolicyEast with research interests in Central Asian geopolitics, regional integration, and international relations.Her work focuses on foreign policy, connectivity initiatives, and political developments across Eurasia. She aims to produce evidence-based analysis that contributes to informed discussions on regional affair.
