Arms Control in the Middle East: A Forgotten Dream

Shehar Bano

The operation Midnight Hammer of the US struck Iran’s three nuclear sites, Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, greatly exposing the stark reality that in the Middle East, arms control and disarmament are a long-lost dream now. Far from neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability, it created exactly the incentive Tehran lacked: a reason to rebuild its program with greater resolve. Overshadowed by rising regional mistrust, a deepening security dilemma among regional states, and the return of military means of coercion instead of diplomacy, a realistic arms control framework remains elusive, signaling a potential increase in nuclear proliferation.

The death of diplomacy is the birth of uncertainty, the price of which the Middle East will pay in the currency of a nuclear arms race.

Historically, the region has witnessed several arms control efforts, such as the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks in the 1990s, the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ), and the global NPT 1968. These measures failed mainly due to mistrust among the Middle Eastern countries and the ambiguity regarding Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which never joined the NPT nor allowed full IAEA inspections of its facilities.  

The US-Israel attack on Iran has exacerbated the need for nuclear deterrence and has brought the region on the path of proliferation. Iran now sees nuclear weapons as a necessity for national security. It has withdrawn from the IAEA protocols, removed UN surveillance, claiming Israel obtained its secret information from them, and banned the IAEA Director from its nuclear sites. The Iranian Parliament is also drafting a resolution to exit the NPT as well. If it does, this will create a security dilemma in the region as Saudi Arabia will follow suit, which Muhammad bin Salman already acknowledged that it will surely seek a nuclear arsenal if Iran builds one.

If Saudi Arabia becomes nuclear, then there will be an unconventional arms race in the Middle East. This could add to the possible insecurity of the UAE and Qatar. It’s highly unlikely for them to pursue nuclear capability, but they will surely seek extended deterrence, possibly from the West. Meanwhile, Egypt remains focused on civilian nuclear development, and they have completed the construction of the El Daaba Nuclear Power Plant in 2022, which is expected to be fully operational by 2030.

Iran’s decision can be contextualized in the broader framework of the US selective enforcement and nuclear privilege for Israel in the Middle East. Israel possesses 80 to 90 undeclared nuclear warheads, which have been an open secret since the 1960s. It never joined the NPT, and the IAEA does not have access to the sites. This created a nuclear asymmetry in the region that, in light of recent events, now undermines the credibility of calls for a nuclear weapon’s weapon-free Middle East.

Iran now sees nuclear weapons as a necessity for national security.

While the US celebrates the operation as a strategic victory, the ground realities suggest otherwise. Washington calls it a historical moment as they claim the complete obliteration of Iran’s nuclear program. However, the experts opine that Iran had moved its HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) stockpile to somewhere else, which is estimated to be 400kg. The program may be delayed by two years, as claimed by Israel, but surely Iran’s defiance is certain. It is highly unlikely that Iran will trust the US or other parties for any future talks and is most likely to build it secretly. This ushers in the vicious cycle of military force dictating security instead of dialogue has become the norm of the day.  

The death of diplomacy is the birth of uncertainty, the price of which the Middle East will pay in the currency of a nuclear arms race. This marks a clear shift from the methods of restraining nuclear ambitions that could have been managed by negotiations and agreements. It also unmasks the brutal reality that alliance interest takes precedence over any international law or diplomatic norms for Washington and Tel Aviv. Resultantly, it has reached a point of no return for diplomacy until scores are settled on the battlefield.

Arms control mechanisms alone cannot do much until the revival of the belief that diplomacy still addresses insecurity better than any military aggression.

In light of new realities, collective arms control initiatives like JCPOA 2.0 or the Middle East as weapons weapons-free zone are a far-fetched idea. Since the fear barrier to striking Iran is now lowered, a creepy embrace of latent proliferation under the guise of peaceful nuclear energy is likely to be the region’s new normal.  Arms control mechanisms alone cannot do much until the revival of the belief that diplomacy still addresses insecurity better than any military aggression.

The author is a researcher at IPRI Islamabad. She is an MPhil Graduate in Strategic Studies from National Defense University Islamabad.She can be reached at sheharbano933@gmail.com