Balancing Afghan Refugees, Security, and Economic Strain

Haider Mustehsan

Walking a tight rope, between a rock and a hard place and caught between Scylla and Charybdis, are just a few of the idioms that underpin the geopolitical and socio-political duality that Pakistan finds itself embroiled in when dealing with the Afghan Refugee reality. On one hand, Pakistan has an obligation enshrined in international law to host, protect and look after the wellbeing of its refugees.

On the other, it has an obligation to protect and empower its citizens and defend its institutions and sovereignty, as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan. Navigating through these tumultuous waters while keeping the sails enacted is indeed no easy task and will require a nuanced, balanced and surefooted approach by the current government and relevant stakeholders.

Pakistan hosts over 4 million Afghan refugees despite not being a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

Despite Pakistan not being a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or its 1967 protocol, and despite facing its own economic and social challenges, it has always maintained an environment of hospitality by offering safety to those in need. Through its inclusive policies, it has accommodated Afghan refugees in the public education, health care, and employment sectors. Pakistan is bound by customary international law, which mandates states to respect the principle of non-refoulement — the prohibition against returning refugees to a place where they face persecution.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, often carrying this burden with limited or no international support. The country currently hosts approximately 1.4 million documented refugees, while the total figure is likely north of 4 million once accounted for undocumented personnel. Compared to Iran and other places where Afghan refugees are given little to no social mobility and freedom of movement, Pakistan serves as a prime example of openhandedness. In many cases, it has gone above and beyond its call of duty to the refugees.

On the one hand, there is credible data to make a case that the presence of Afghan refugees has positively impacted the socio-economic fabric of Pakistan through many Afghans buying property, establishing legal businesses, and acquiring legal jobs to boost the economy. However, on the other hand, there is also proof that many documented and undocumented refugees alike have been implicated and found wanting in many illicit activities and terrorism.

Ex-Interior Minister, Sarfraz Bugti, stated that Afghan nationals were responsible for a significant portion of violent attacks, citing that 14 out of 24 suicide bombings in 2023 were perpetrated by Afghan nationals. Adding to this, many refugees (especially the youth) harbor deep-rooted resentment and distaste for Pakistan leading to a rejection of local laws, crime, and disobedience to authority. This along with the resurgence and strengthening of the TTP, serves as a dire national security threat to the stability of the country.

The economic strain and security risks, including links to terrorism, have intensified calls for a phased repatriation.

Pakistan’s current socio-economic and national security realities do not leave much room to indefinitely continue the proper and well-managed regulation of the Refugee population. The economy is under immense strain and pressure as resources are being stretched thin across sectors, already burdened by high inflation, unemployment, and external debt. The social landscape is becoming tense as refugees and Pakistani citizens have to compete for employment, healthcare facilities, and educational institutions.

Moreover, the lack of funding and unwillingness of the international community (especially the relevant powers directly involved in Afghanistan) to cooperate with Pakistan in pursuit of a stable and actionable plan further exacerbate the issues. According to a recent study, only a mere 25% of the total budget needed to appropriately address the refugees’ needs is being given. The rest of the capital is then left to the Pakistani authorities to extract from the state budget. This is in fact, unsustainable.

Pakistan was bound by customary international law, which mandated states to respect the principle of non-refoulement — the prohibition against returning refugees to a place where they face persecution. However, Afghanistan is not under occupation anymore, it now commands an indigenous government that garners support from most of its population. In the past 3 years, it has seen a sharp and tangible drop in terrorism or violent activity and can, within reason, be considered a stable territory. Hence, an argument can be made that it is now time to begin the process of repatriation.

In 2023, the government announced the “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan” with the goal to repatriate over one million foreign nationals, but only those that lacked valid documentation. By June 2024, approximately 647,000 Afghans, primarily undocumented, were repatriated. But this came at a cost socio-political cost, as the plan was considered a knee-jerk reaction to the TTP’s terrorist activities and garnered much displeasure from the many local and international organizations as well as straining an already complicated relationship with the Afghan regime.

The complicated and protracted Afghan refugee predicament needs a robust, nuanced and sustainable plan of action. While it is understood that the refugees must return, it has to be approached with thoughtfulness and care. Pakistan must be careful as to not tarnish and dampen its well-founded efforts and destroy the goodwill it garnered by adopting a policy solely based on security threats. It must develop a careful repatriation plan, that is accomplished in stages maintaining the dignity and respect for the Afghan refugees.

Only 25% of the required funding for refugees is provided internationally, leaving Pakistan to bear the financial burden.

It must leverage international support to secure funding and consensus. It must create a robust and seamless system of biometric registration for Afghans. It may also take into consideration providing Afghans that were born in Pakistan, have legal status and businesses, as well as no crime record a path to citizenship and integration. And finally, it must bi-laterally negotiate and bring the Afghan regime into the fold, to streamline the movement of legal goods and people across borders.

The author holds a BA from SUNY Binghamton and an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from NDU. Currently, he is pursuing internship at IPRI.