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Historically, the European Union has always been more of a regulatory power than a conventional geopolitical actor. While the EU has created an internal market, a common currency, and extensive regulation that influences products outside of the region, it has left hard security to NATO and, by proxy, the United States. This has worked well in the past as the United States has been happy to provide backing while Russia appeared to be a relatively manageable strategic neighbour.

However, both conditions are now less certain, and the concept of strategic autonomy has developed from a political aspiration into an operational policy objective. The key question for foreign policy in Europe is whether the concept will translate into tangible policy.

The concept itself is difficult to define. In Paris, it has traditionally meant becoming less reliant on the United States; cities like Warsaw and Tallinn often perceive it as a risky move, due to their reliance on American protection. Berlin has historically fallen somewhere in the middle, but in Brussels it has been used widely across all sectors.

Energy, technological advancements, supply chains, and trade all fall under the umbrella of strategic autonomy. While this allows governments with varying views to agree on a common theme, it also means there is a lack of consensus. Scholars have pointed out for years that the EU has struggled to define strategic autonomy.

However, it can easily be seen in defence. NATO has estimated that European countries, along with Canada, will increase their core defence spending by around 11% in 2026. Allies have also pledged to increase spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Loan schemes and relaxed regulations on military spending have been introduced within the EU to try and bring the political will into reality.

Supporters argue that the continent is finally taking action on what it has been warned of for years. However, sceptics point out that much of this initial funding has gone to buying American capabilities such as air defence systems. Instead of becoming more independent, Europe is simply changing how it relies on others. It takes time to develop capabilities such as missile defence and satellites, and so at times the only rapid way to do this is by purchasing existing capabilities.

In terms of Ukraine, the European countries and the EU have become the primary funders of Kyiv’s war effort, pledging tens of billions of Euros per year. This is a huge achievement for a bloc that wasn’t designed for war. However, it still relies on American intelligence, weapons, and diplomatic clout. Any resolution will also be influenced by non-Brussels capitals.

While multilateral diplomacy plays well with the EU, it is also where they struggle most. A bloc of 27 member states with avarying geopolitical capabilities benefits much more from a rule-based approach, having courts and negotiated resolutions. However, major players are increasingly favouring bilateral approaches, tariffs and spheres of influence.

Critics argue it is naïve to try and uphold a rule-based system when others aren’t adhering to it. Supporters argue that Europe doesn’t have another option and can still increase their influence by forming coalitions. They have formed trade deals with partners in Latin America and Asia and have increased security ties with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. However, without enforcement, rules lose their credibility without effective enforcement. If Europe went against the rules, then it would lose its main source of influence.

Domestically, the EU may struggle more than anything. Most foreign policy decisions still require unanimous agreement, meaning any individual government can veto decisions and has caused delays to sanctions and statements. The idea of using qualified majority voting has regularly been suggested but always fails due to member states not wanting to lose sovereignty over an issue that defines them. Different threats are perceived depending on the country.

Eastern countries are worried about Russia; southern countries are concerned about migration and the Mediterranean. Others are concerned about trade with China. Funding is also tight, and defence spending has to compete with welfare, climate change and competitiveness in a time of slow growth.

There are varying opinions on how the EU is performing. Some believe that they have changed more in recent years than they have in the previous few decades and there is a clear direction, although there is inconsistency. Others believe strategic autonomy is still mostly a buzzword and real decisions are still being made in Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Finally, some worry that if they push too hard for autonomy, they will alienate the transatlantic partner on which their security architecture continues to depend (America) and undermine the democratic solidarity they claim to have.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said they aim to create a more European NATO so they can stay transatlantic. This shows they see strategic autonomy as a balance within an alliance rather than leaving. Whether this is the case will depend less on statements made at summits and more on whether they can actually produce the ammunition, make decisions quickly, and whether twenty-seven governments can work together despite differing priorities.

Abdul Rehman is an emerging researcher and writer on international affairs with a focus on geopolitics, geoeconomics, and strategic mineral policies, including rare earth elements. He has contributed analytical articles and research spotlights on regional dynamics, statecraft, and contemporary global affairs to various platforms.

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