Madina Yusupova
Uzbekistan applied to join the World Trade Organization in 1994. Negotiations resumed in earnest in 2020, and Tashkent aimed to finish them in time for the WTO’s ministerial conference in Cameroon in March 2026. That date has passed, and officials now say they will complete accession within 2026. The delay invites an easy conclusion that the process is stuck. A better reading is that the work still left is the work that matters most, and that it reveals what membership is really for.
On the bilateral side, the job is largely done. Uzbekistan has completed market-access talks with 33 WTO members, and Russia concluded its negotiations in December 2025. What remains is multilateral: agreeing the wording of Uzbekistan’s final commitments and the working party report. After the 13th Working Party meeting in July, Tashkent received more than 150 written questions. Questions of that kind are rarely about tariff lines. They probe how the state behaves.
The usual case for accession is market access, and it is weaker than it sounds. Uzbekistan already trades under preferential arrangements with many partners, including the EU’s GSP+ scheme, so the extra tariff relief from membership would be modest. For a double landlocked exporter, transport costs and border delays do more damage than duty rates. If market access were the only prize, the delay would hardly matter.
The stronger case is credibility. The reforms since 2017, including currency liberalisation, an end to state organised forced labour in the cotton harvest and a more open border regime, were driven largely from the top. That gave them speed, but it also makes them reversible, and investors price that risk.
A WTO schedule turns policy into obligation. Bound tariffs, subsidy disciplines and transparency requirements mean that backsliding becomes something other members can challenge and, ultimately, take to dispute settlement. A WTO deputy director-general has described accession as a way of anchoring an economy-wide reform process, which is a fair description of what Tashkent is buying.
That is also why the last stretch is difficult. Large parts of energy, banking, mining and transport remain state-controlled, and members want to know whether those firms enjoy cheap credit, privileged contracts or protected pricing. Utility and energy subsidies are politically sensitive and have been unwound only gradually. Agriculture supports a large rural population, so any change in farm support is a social question as much as an economic one. Domestic producers sheltered by high duties, car assembly being the clearest case, will lobby for long transition periods.
Critics at home have a fair point. Uzbekistan wants to build manufacturing, and tight WTO rules on subsidies and local-content requirements narrow the toolkit that earlier industrialisers used. That is a real trade-off. But protection was never free: support that shields one inefficient producer taxes every business downstream, and Uzbekistan’s exporters of textiles, fruit and processed goods are among those paying. Accession does not forbid industrial policy. It asks that the support be transparent, time-limited and justified.
The record so far shows genuine movement, summarised in the table below. Uzbek officials report having aligned around 190 legal and regulatory acts with WTO requirements. But a statute on paper is not compliance. The real test will come after accession, in customs offices, courts and ministries, when a foreign exporter or a rival member checks whether the rule in the book is the rule in practice.
| Year | Milestone |
| 1994 | Uzbekistan applies for WTO membership |
| 2020 | Active accession negotiations resume |
| March 2026 | Target of finishing by MC14 in Cameroon is missed |
| July 2026 | 13th Working Party meeting; goal reset to 2026; 150+ written questions follow |
| October 2026 | Bilateral talks complete with 33 members; nine sections of commitments agreed |
| November 2026 | Preparations under way for the 14th Working Party meeting |
Uzbekistan’s WTO accession: key milestones. Sources: WTO, Gazeta.uz, UzDaily, Trend.Az.
Geopolitics adds a final wrinkle. Uzbekistan is an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union and keeps working relationships with Moscow, Beijing, Brussels and the Gulf. Russia’s sign-off suggests membership is no longer read as a move against anyone. Still, WTO commitments will limit how far Tashkent can go in preferential deals with any bloc, so its multi-vector diplomacy will have to operate inside a rulebook.
Uzbekistan will probably cross the line before long. What matters more is the kind of member it becomes. Three takeaways follow. First, the case for accession rests on credibility, not on tariff cuts. Second, the hardest commitments are the ones touching state enterprises, subsidies and agriculture, and these deserve honest explanation to domestic producers rather than quiet delay. Third, a record of aligned laws will count for little unless customs officers and courts apply them. Tashkent can make its case best by publishing clear data on state support and by treating its schedule as a promise to its own future governments as much as to Geneva.

Madina is a Business Administration student with a keen interest in marketing and data analytics. With experience in digital marketing and cross-cultural communication, she is particularly interested in exploring business trends, consumer behavior, and the evolving relationship between technology and business. She is committed to continuous learning and developing a broader understanding of the business landscape.





