LAC Patrolling: A Fragile Consensus

Asma Khan Durrani

Is India’s Diplomatic Tango with China Just Smoke and Mirrors?

The ink on the latest India-China patrolling agreement is barely dry, yet cracks in the diplomatic veneer are already glaring.  The recent Indo-China border agreements, hailed as a diplomatic triumph by the Indian government, have ignited a storm of controversy and skepticism.

While official narratives paint a picture of restored normalcy and reduced tensions, a closer examination reveals a more complex reality. The question arises: Is India truly emerging victorious from these negotiations, or is it merely a tactical retreat disguised as a diplomatic breakthrough?

The buffer zones set under the veil of peace and cooperation are not very much advantageous to India.

Recently, the Indo-China patrolling agreement at the BRICS forum has come to focus as people believe that it is a mere eye-wash diplomatic initiative that covers many compromises beneficial to China. At the heart of the debate is India’s reduced access to critical Line of Actual Control (LAC) patrolling points, where nearly 60% of its previous patrolling areas remain restricted. Skeptics say these buffer areas actually extend China’s strategic encroachment and the difference between diplomatic achievements advertised and the ground situation is vast.

Although the government has presented the patrolling consensus as a diplomatic achievement, there are a number of questions about the actual weight of this narrative. Ex-ambassadors and defense analysts have warned that these buffer zones are not a neutral act, as they do not return to the status quo before February 2020. These areas seem to consolidate Chinese power, which distorts the strategic posture of India in the disputed region. This has added to doubts the media narrative of India’s diplomatic “success”. However, military experts argue that this common narrative actually conceals the changes on the ground that threaten India’s national security.

The losses which are regarded tactical are concessions; they include rights of access to such vital patrol points as the water point and grazing grounds which are now within Chinese territory. In truth, the optics of the agreement work to China’s advantage as Beijing is able to appear as though it is for optics to serve more as a public relations exercise, allowing China to project cooperation without yielding any real ground.

Uncertainty works in China’s favor as it utilizes the murkiness of the situation to escalate its authority while avoiding a direct confrontation.

Another clear signal of China’s position is the fact that President Xi Jinping has not given much attention to the China-India relations in his recent speeches. His focus on cooperation with Russia shows that China’s interests are really in other areas, and demonstrated a lack of concern for India. This silence, reflects a broader diplomatic strategy: China seems ready to make cosmetic concessions while basically consolidating its control over critical sectors. The buffer zones set under the veil of peace and cooperation are not very much advantageous to India.

Although Indian herders have been provided permission to graze inside the territories that are at the moment occupied by China, the opponents underscore pertaining security threats which derive from this privilege. The action, in essence, legalizes People’s Liberation Army presence in areas over which both India and China had been in a territorial dispute earlier, and which raises questions on India’s security in the Line of Actual Control.

Such grazing rights, combined with inadequate patrolling, shifts the balance of power to China. The understanding has not lessened tensions on the old sticking points such as Depsang and Demchok where China remains assertive. The inability to achieve de-escalation at these areas not only means that important issues remain open but also strengthens the view that China is tightening its control over these territories. Lack of tangible policy changes in these areas, Indian reduced patrolling rights demonstrate a clear shift of strategic balance that erodes its standing at the LAC.

This adds to the strategic disadvantage the uncertainty that shroud these buffer zones. Uncertainty works in China’s favor as it utilizes the murkiness of the situation to escalate its authority while avoiding a direct confrontation. This is what the strategists call ‘strategic ambiguity’ while for India the reduction in the operational visibility on the ground hinders the overall ability to respond. The case is typical for China’s policy in the LAC where diplomacy covers for territorial expansion.

The gap between the media representation of events and actual event analysis has raised public and political awareness.

Such contradiction between the words of the government and realities of the situation has created controversy among opposition parties as well as military planners. They pointed out that the buffer zones are a major military loss for India, a loss that could have serious strategic implications for its future ability to manage the border regions. Instead of obtaining the balanced solution between two countries, the cooperation is considered as the transfer of the strategic advantage to China.

These facts give rise to critical questions about the strategic configuration of the India’s LAC. In general, as the winter is near, both countries strengthen their military force in the region. However, when India has been restricted its access the above mentioned areas, the nation might face a problem of not being able to keep a proper track on certain areas efficiently. Thus the restrictions imposed by the agreement not only reduce India’s operational capacities but also make it dependent on Chinese goodwill – something that is all the more worrying given the historical animosity between the two powers.

The gap between the media representation of events and actual event analysis has raised public and political awareness. While narrative of diplomatic success unfolds, the defense analysts and opposition voices have pointed out that there is no tangible change on ground in terms of security. The tendency to emphasize optics rather than substance makes many wonder whether India’s government is really pushing the country in the right strategic direction. Instead, the concessions given to China give an indication of a retreat in India’s position as presented in domestic discourses, rather than a diplomatic victory.

The tendency to emphasize optics rather than substance makes many wonder whether India’s government is really pushing the country in the right strategic direction.

The Indo-China patrolling agreement underscores a troubling pattern: while there has been increased diplomatic talks, the actual on ground situation seems to be more beneficial to China and brings into question the amount of control India has over the LAC. A hint of such a realignment can be discerned from restricted access to strategic points, ambiguous buffer zones, as well as lack of de-escalation at friction sites. However, on the ground, the specificities of the agreement are once again packed with strategic advantages that are more beneficial to China than India and the latter’s borders remain insecure.

The author is a scholar in Defence-Strategic Affairs, with a Master of Philosophy in International Relations, focused on grounded insights from the South Asian and Middle Eastern regions highlighting economic, political, and warfare dimensions. Her work includes critically assessing military operations, defense policies, and security dynamics across volatile regions.