LAC Patrolling: A Fragile Consensus
November 6, 2024A Plea for Justice
November 8, 2024Hammad Waleed
The United States and India have long championed their “strategic partnership” as an emerging alliance in Asia, intended to counter China on the contemporary Asian chessboard. This partnership is often highlighted by emphasizing shared democratic values and mutual security interests. Yet, recent events have cast doubt on the consistency and robustness of these “strategic partners.”
Amid global tensions heightened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India’s neutral stance and continued ties with Russia have revealed notable divergences from U.S. foreign policy expectations, suggesting that India might not be the socius belli the U.S. is counting on.
With 19 Indian entities and two individuals recently sanctioned by the U.S. for alleged support of Russia, questions have surfaced about India’s role in the broader geopolitical landscape, particularly regarding the reliability of this partnership in the context of QUAD and other “allies” converging against China.
The United States recently imposed sanctions on these 19 Indian entities, citing concerns over their involvement in activities supporting Russia’s defense industry. According to U.S. authorities, these entities are linked to dual-use technology transfers that benefit Russia’s military capabilities, in violation of global sanctions.
This development reflects growing U.S. frustration with India’s ambivalent stance, underscoring a potential rift in an alliance that Washington once hoped would counterbalance China’s influence in the region.
Since the early 2000s, the United States and India have expanded their strategic partnership, largely in response to shared concerns over China’s regional ambitions and the need for a stable Indo-Pacific. In her book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War”, Tanvi Madan discusses the interplay between the U.S., India, and China, showing how American perceptions of India were shaped by a need for strategic partners in Asia, where the American purview is driven largely by the China factor.
The U.S. has supported India’s economic development and defence capabilities, and both countries have engaged in multiple defence and intelligence-sharing agreements. India has received advanced American weapons systems.
In 2020, India was designated a “Major Defense Partner,” a status signifying preferential treatment in defense cooperation. Yet, these advances are overshadowed by India’s historical reliance on Russia for defense equipment and energy security, complicating its stance in times of conflict involving its major allies.
India’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exemplifies its balancing act or lets say…walking a tightrope between big powers. Despite international condemnation of the Russian invasion, India has refrained from taking a strong stance, instead opting to remain neutral.
This neutrality, while aimed at safeguarding India’s diplomatic flexibility, has strained its relationship with the United States, which has sought to rally allies around a unified stance against Russian aggression. For instance, in a statement to the United Nations, India abstained from voting on resolutions condemning the invasion, citing its commitment to a “balanced” and “independent” foreign policy.
A significant factor in India’s neutrality is its dependency on Russian oil and defense equipment. Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India has continued to purchase Russian crude oil at discounted rates, which has indirectly contributed to Russia’s war effort by stabilizing its economy in the face of international sanctions.
According to data from Reuters, India’s imports of Russian crude oil increased exponentially following the conflict, providing Moscow with critical revenue amid Western sanctions. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated that “India’s decisions are based on its own assessments of national interest” , a stance that has been perceived by the U.S. as undermining efforts to isolate Russia.
A few years earlier, divergences also became apparent when India acquired advanced Russian S-400 Missile defence system. Tanvi Madan’s book also emphasizes how the “ suspicions” were persistent during Obama and later Trump years, as USA imposed CAATSA sanctions on India for purchasing the Russian system.
Ironically, the sanctions are yet to be passed, awaiting approval from the senate. But this move illustrated that despite strategic alignment on China, U.S. suspicion over India’s foreign policy independence remained intact
U.S. leadership has historically viewed India with a degree of suspicion, particularly during the Cold War and in moments when India’s foreign policy starkly diverged from American interests. This trepidation often stemmed from India’s non-aligned stance, its relationship with the Soviet Union, and its self coined “independent” approach to global diplomacy, which contrasted with U.S. alliances and objectives.
Throughout the Cold War and India’s “Non-Aligned” period, United States leadership exhibited a consistent pattern of suspicion toward India. India’s stance, which claimed neutrality from either of the two Cold War blocs, was often interpreted as tacit support for the Soviet Union. Similarly, during President Eisenhower’s tenure, American anxiety over India’s position continued.
Dennis Kux, in his book “India and the United States: Estranged Democracies”, argues that Eisenhower’s administration found it difficult to fully trust a nation that sought friendship with both the United States and the Soviet Union. India’s purchase of military equipment from the Soviet Union further fuelled U.S. distrust.
Moving to the Reagan era, America’s efforts to woo India persisted but were undermined by enduring Indo-Soviet interdependence. In parallel, during the Soviet Afghan War, the U.S. increasingly relied on Pakistan to achieve mutual aims in Afghanistan—a policy that initially worked in collective advantage, bolstering Pakistan’s credentials as a more reliable security partner. However, this partnership faced challenges ahead as Washington’s diplomatic overtures to India raised concerns in Pakistan.
Despite U.S. efforts, India has often defied American expectations regarding nuclear proliferation. President Bill Clinton aimed to enhance economic ties, recognizing India’s market potential following its economic liberalization in 1991 under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. However, when Prime Minister Vajpayee’s government proceeded with nuclear tests, it disrupted the regional stability equation.
President Clinton condemned the tests and imposed economic sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. Strobe Talbott, in his book “Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb”, stated that “the nuclear tests revived U.S. fears about proliferation and questioned India’s commitment to global non-proliferation norms.”
India’s abrasiveness came into spotlight last year and is subject to a diplomatic crisis between the country and Canada these days as well. To provide a context, in September last year , Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau asserted credible evidence suggesting Indian government agents’ involvement in a Sikh activist’s assassination.
This claim led to drawdown of bilateral diplomatic ties reciprocal expulsions of diplomats between Canada and India. The Five Eyes alliance, comprising the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand, played a pivotal role in the intelligence assessments related to the incident. It is notable that the United States plays a central role in the Five Eyes alliance, coordinating intelligence-sharing protocols and leading joint operations. The U.S. Ambassador to Canada, David Cohen, confirmed that shared intelligence among Five Eyes partners informed Canada’s allegations against India.
Other Five Eyes members, including the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand, acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations. Just this week, the Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong stated that she engaged in discussions with Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar regarding the allegations raised by Canada during his visit to Canberra.
India hold the position of refuting Canada’s assertion that Indian Home Minister Amit Shah authorized actions targeting Sikh activists within Canadian territory. While the US and its allies have given a lukewarm response to such Indian actions, precedence tells us that Western democracies have been very sensitive to covert ops in their territory- even more so for deliberate killings. After the Novochovik nerve agent killings, alleged to be a Russian plot in the UK, vocal condemnation of President Putin reverbed across Western capitals.
In a coordinated response, over 20 countries, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, and numerous European Union states, expelled Russian diplomats. The United States alone expelled 60 Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. Altogether, approximately 150 Russian diplomats were expelled globally, marking one of the largest coordinated expulsions of its kind. Propping up India as a counterweight to China might not substantiate Washington’s aims in the way it envisages, as both the game of pretension and overlooking will simply embolden India and, in turn, its hegemonic designs—which would be contrary to the U.S. strategic outlook—ultimately affecting strategic stability at the expense of America’s overly warm behavior toward Delhi.
By waiving off India’s recalcitrance, the U.S. has created a renegade out of a fair-weather ally that is making the most of the multipolar transition as the U.S.-China power struggle unfolds. Yet the U.S. is overlooking the concerns that its allies or even its strategic circles might have about the course it is pursuing in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific. India, which candidly claims it aims to become a “pole” itself, has timidly favoured any tangible American interest in the region, instead using its newfound convenience to trample diplomatic and legal ethics with gloves off.
Hammad Waleed is a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. He graduated with distinction from National Defence University, Islamabad. He writes on issues pertaining National Security, Conflict analysis , Emerging Technology, Strategic forecast and Public policy . He can be reached at hammadwaleed@thesvi.org