Misreading Nuclear Realities: Contextualizing South Asia’s Deterrence Dynamics

Umair Khan

Surprisingly, internationally well-known news agencies such as The Wall Street Journal opt for stories that appear more like ideology than journalism when covering, especially where issue as such and sensitive as South Asian nuclear deterrence is involved. The recent description of Pakistan’s nuclear program as a marauding enterprise is yet another such example, which falls perfectly within this negative trend. Not only does such a description tend towards historical fact distortion, but it also demonizes the complex geopolitical rationale behind the nuclearization of Pakistan. Where such higher-order media fail to pick up contextual facts that are pertinent, it is destined to enhance skewed perception further, which will not be very helpful in international diplomatic communication.

India’s 1974 test was a geostrategic earthquake that forced its neighbour to reconsider its security orthodoxy.

The causes of Pakistan’s nuclear aspiration were in no agreement and a militarist hegemony motive. Rather, they were caused by the region’s destabilizing reorientation owing to the 1974 nuclear test by India. The Smiling Buddha experiment itself was no scientific wonder; it was a geostrategic earthquake. It transformed the strategic landscape in South Asia, essentially compelling Pakistan to confront its security orthodoxy at the behest of a peer nuclear-armed competitor. To overlook this chain of cause and effect and, rather, shrink Pakistan’s nuclear journey as irresponsible is to engage in selective history that fosters a specific narrative but closes eyes to stark realities.

Pakistan’s nuclear journey was not embarked upon in isolation or ideology-fueled hubris. It was due to an extended era of hostility and strategic ambiguity. Ever since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has endured a series of aggressions at India’s command, aired in the form of diplomatic problems, ongoing conflict, and a constant effort to dismantle its sovereignty. The pain of 1971, when Indian aggression led to the disintegration of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, still lingers vividly in its collective memory. It is to invalidate this context that one removes the reasoning that had guided Pakistan’s security agenda.

Second, the narrative situating Pakistan as a terrorism speaker is not merely old but also intellectually stagnant. It fails to consider Pakistan’s ginormous sacrifice in the war against terror in terms of human lives lost and the stability of its economy. The pioneering role played by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, sometimes in cooperation with global forces, is hardly considered in Western quarters. The value of the Pakistani culture and effectiveness of the Pakistan army and intelligence apparatus at breaking up terror networks are shortchanged in such circles eager to spend the tired platitudes of modern decades.

Since credible nuclear parity emerged, no large-scale conventional war has erupted in South Asia.

Additionally, the picture of Pakistan as a sole South Asian country expert in conducting subversive operations is one-sidedly blown out of proportion. Indian efforts in subversion engineering inside Pakistan, for instance, like in Balochistan, have been well chronicled for a long time, even by the official Indian government. The inconsistency of such a treatment is hardly paid lip service in such passion. Western media will likely have no hesitation in criticizing Pakistani policy so readily, but much less so freely a critical analysis of Indian policy, even the destabilizing ones.

It should be pointed out as well that Pakistan’s capability to produce nuclear weapons has been, instead of destabilizing, in South Asia. An obvious absence of conventional war between India and Pakistan has taken place in the region since Pakistan achieved nuclear deterrence. Though tensions have continued, nuclear parity instilled caution and prudence in the relationship between the two nations. The existence of mutual deterrence compelled both nations to remain highly sensitive to the devastating consequences of a climb in escalation and hence indirectly promoted dialogue, though fragile.

It is not only misrepresenting but also hypocritical to try and dress the nuclear policy of Pakistan in the attire of irresponsibility, especially towards other nuclear powers in the region. The reality is that Pakistan did have a credible minimum deterrent and pleaded for strategic stability in the region on a continuous basis. It has never been discouraged from arms control negotiations or confidence-building measures, even though these have remained non-reciprocative.

Portraying one programme as irresponsible overlooks its minimum-deterrent posture and repeated calls for regional arms control.

The reporting carried out by such powerful media outlets as WSJ, garnering attention in such a manner, distorts not just the defense policy of a nation but the opinion of the world based on distorted or incomplete facts. The world today is marked by complex and unpredictable international relations, where countries are experiencing conflicts that are growing in complexity and unpredictability. Journalism has a responsibility to bridge the gap between ideological bias and provide more balanced, historically grounded analysis. It is only through such receptiveness that world audiences can see the actual contours of security and diplomacy in places like South Asia.

The author is a student of M Phil in International Relations at the University of Punjab. He can be reached at @ umairkhanmail50@gmail.com