The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, brokered by the World Bank, governs the use of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan. It is widely regarded as a successful model of transboundary water conflict resolution, having endured multiple episodes of political and military tension between the two nations.
Pakistan views the Indus Waters Treaty as a legal lifeline, not a political bargaining chip.
The Treaty allocates the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, granting each party specific rights and usage obligations. Pakistan’s unrestricted rights over the Western Rivers were intended to ensure agricultural and ecological sustainability in a downstream-dependent country, while India received usage over the Eastern Rivers, with some limited Pakistani transitional entitlements. This careful division was meant to balance the needs of two nuclear-armed neighbours sharing one of the world’s most critical water systems.
Pakistan now argues that India has repeatedly breached this balance, violating not only the letter but also the spirit of the Treaty. The legal disputes arise from several key issues:
First, Pakistan points to India’s construction of hydroelectric projects, particularly the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams on the Western Rivers, as violations of Article III and Annex D. These provisions restrict upstream activities that obstruct or reduce flows vital to Pakistan’s irrigation systems.
Second, Pakistan highlights procedural violations. Under Annexures D and E, India is obligated to notify Pakistan of dam designs and allow technical objections. Pakistan argues India has systematically failed to comply, limiting opportunities for bilateral resolution. The IWT’s dispute settlement process is graded, starting with Permanent Indus Commissioners, then escalating to a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration (CoA) if necessary. But procedural shortcuts, Pakistan claims, erode this cooperative framework.
India’s unilateral suspension of Treaty obligations undermines international water law and regional stability.
Third, Pakistan draws on broader international water law principles. Though the IWT predates the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997), Pakistan invokes its principles, particularly equitable and reasonable utilisation. This customary norm holds that upstream states must respect downstream rights and ensure fair and sustainable use.
Closely linked is the no significant harm principle, embedded in Article 7 of the 1997 Convention and earlier codified in the Helsinki Rules (1966). Pakistan maintains that India’s dam constructions and water management practices cause transboundary harm, affecting not only agricultural output but also the ecological balance of the Indus system, thus violating this principle.
These legal concerns have played out through formal dispute mechanisms. In 2005, Pakistan challenged the Baglihar project before a Neutral Expert, who found India’s design broadly compliant but recommended minor technical adjustments. In 2013, Pakistan escalated the Kishanganga dispute to a CoA, which allowed India’s diversion of Neelum waters to the Jhelum but imposed conditions: India must maintain minimum downstream flows and refrain from certain operational practices, such as lowering reservoirs below the “dead storage” level.
The pattern continued in 2016–2017, when Pakistan sought arbitration over new Indian projects. However, the dispute resolution process became gridlocked. India referred matters to a Neutral Expert, while Pakistan approached the CoA. India argued the two mechanisms could not run simultaneously, effectively stalling proceedings. Despite India’s objections, the CoA was established at Pakistan’s request. India then boycotted the proceedings, while simultaneously pressing ahead before the Neutral Expert. Pakistan, by contrast, has chosen to participate fully in both tracks.
Recent developments have sharply escalated tensions. On 26 May 2025, India formally wrote to the Neutral Expert to suspend proceedings, arguing it had placed the Treaty “in abeyance.” Pakistan categorically rejected this on 27 May, insisting there is no legal basis to halt the agreed timetable and urging the Neutral Expert to proceed. The Expert has now sought India’s response by 5 June 2025.
The international community must uphold treaty-based water diplomacy to prevent conflict escalation.
What is unprecedented is not just the legal brinkmanship but the parallel military escalation. In May 2025, India unilaterally declared it was suspending its obligations under the IWT, a move without precedent in modern transboundary water agreements. This declaration coincided with cross-border missile strikes into Pakistani territory. Pakistan, initially restrained, eventually retaliated militarily, leading to a dangerous tit-for-tat confrontation. A ceasefire has since been brokered, but the core issues remain unresolved. Pakistan has made clear that its right to the Indus waters is a non-negotiable red line, untouchable by military or political threats.
Legally, Pakistan’s position is robust. It rests not only on the explicit obligations enshrined in the Treaty but also on the foundational principles of international water law, equitable utilisation, the no significant harm rule, and the importance of procedural transparency in water infrastructure development. By unilaterally suspending its obligations, India risks undermining the rule of law in international water relations. If such a foundational agreement can be abrogated without consequence, the precedent for other international treaties is deeply troubling.
“If India is allowed to ridicule international conventions, no one will respect and honour its commitments in the community of nations.”
Barrister Amjad Malik
The author holds an MA, LLM , and he is the Chair of, Association of Pakistan Lawyers.
