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As the U.S. election results settle, global attention shifts to understanding what a potential second Trump administration would mean for U.S.-China relations. Afterall, the whole foreign policy discourse is fraught with the Sino-US competition and Trumps firebrand rhetoric which signalled an aggressive shift towards the Asian giant during Trump’s first period in the Oval office.
China, and nearly every other country with stakes in the International order, would be closely monitoring developments, assessing both opportunities and risks in light of previous interactions with former President Donald Trump. This articles unpacks the questions around China’s evolving view of Trump’s foreign policy, examining key moments from his first term and exploring how Chinese policymakers might approach a renewed Trump presidency.
A second Trump administration may pursue a more aggressive stance on China, complicating diplomatic relations.
In Trump’s initial years in office, China held a largely transactional view of U.S. relations, especially regarding trade. Beijing believed Trump’s priority lay in securing economic gains rather than ideological shifts. This view shaped China’s approach, with top-down coordination from Chinese President Xi Jinping to quickly establish channels to the new administration, culminating in the 2017 summit at Mar-a-Lago.
China’s initial optimism was soon tested. Trump’s administration surprised Beijing by implementing tariffs and pushing hard on trade issues, primarily driven by then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. This escalation resulted in a trade war by 2018, destabilizing U.S.-China relations. For Beijing, this period marked the beginning of a much more complex relationship, revealing that U.S. concerns extended beyond economics rather strategic security underpinnings.
China initially believed the U.S. trade friction could be managed through economic negotiations, a view underscored by the 2019 Phase One Trade Deal, which seemed to signal a return to transactional diplomacy. However, the arrival of COVID-19 fundamentally altered this dynamic. The pandemic not only strained the practical channels of U.S.-China communication but also intensified the rhetoric and tensions between the two countries, especially as both sides attributed blame for the virus’s origins .
In this vacuum, misunderstandings mounted, escalating tensions further. Events like the 2020 detention of Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, compounded Chinese anxieties and underscored a broader U.S. strategy that China viewed as existentially threatening.
The breakdown in official and unofficial diplomatic channels between the U.S. and China had severe consequences. The back-and-forth retaliatory actions—such as consulate closures in Houston and Chengdu—reflected a deepening divide. Both sides resorted to “tit-for-tat” measures, escalating friction in areas such as press freedom, espionage concerns, and Hong Kong’s autonomy. In the Chinese view, these moves signalled that the Trump administration was increasingly intent on undermining China’s political stability, rather than simply recalibrating trade relations.
The trade war initiated during Trump’s first term has evolved into a complex relationship marked by strategic mistrust.
By late 2020, both countries entered an especially tense phase, marked by China’s heightened mistrust and misinterpretation of U.S. intentions. This tension reached a peak with General Mark Milley’s phone calls to his Chinese counterpart, prompted by Chinese fears of a potential U.S. attack. This event highlighted the absence of effective communication channels led to overreactions and a breakdown of strategic trust, highlighting the necessity of open channels to prevent further miscalculations.
With Trump now a prospective leader again, China faces a dilemma. A cursory look at upcoming US cabinet shows that the hawks are back, this time even more hawkish in their discourse and credentials. The question looming over Chinese policymakers is whether a second Trump administration would pursue transactional engagement—a “new deal”—or embrace a full-scale decoupling strategy aimed at economically isolating China. For China, understanding Trump’s stance is critical. Although Beijing recognizes that U.S. policy consensus on China has grown increasingly negative across both political parties.
There is a backdrop to this as well. When Biden succeeded Trump, the former actually solidified the foray against Beijing. If not more, then Biden government flexed its muscles against China when it came to tariffs, import controls and hindering access to critical technologies. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the CHIP4 Alliance, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the Minerals Security Partnership and in security dimension, Biden built up AUKUS following the QUAD, while reconfiguring formal and informal alliances in the Asia-Pacific to “ counter” China. The overall sentiment in US policy circles vis-a-vis China remained on a continuum, which Biden’s era marked with a workable reengagement.
Trump’s nominations for his cabinet are overly ‘ hawkish’ towards China. President-elect Donald Trump’s recent appointments of Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Representative Michael Waltz as National Security Adviser signal a distinct trajectory for U.S. foreign policy. Rubio’s stance on China focuses on ideological opposition to the Chinese Communist Party, with Taiwan at the heart of his strategy. He believes that a strong Taiwan is critical for regional stability and has introduced measures to expedite arms sales to the island.
Waltz shares Rubio’s perspective but adds a strategic layer, calling for clear U.S. deterrence and regional preparedness to counter China’s ambitions. However, a lot of the policy analysis can only be predicted when Trump enters the Oval office. As for the hawks, its one thing to present rhetoric – which has been intermittently shifting in Trump’s inner circle- and another when you enter into executive offices and your purview of impending problems shifts to address day-to-day issues.
In the immediate period, the greater focus of second Trump government will be fixated on polarizing domestic issues which include : immigration, executive power, abortion rights and civil service reform. His Tariff regime is also being viewed with caution not only in China, but even domestic circles and America’s own allies. Trump’s proposal for his second term goes beyond targeting specific goods. With plans to impose a 60% tariff on all imports from China and up to 20% on goods from other countries, he is escalating trade tensions to an unprecedented level.
By taxing imports, he aims to reduce the trade deficit, bring manufacturing back to American shores, and bolster national security. But economists argue that this approach neglects the interdependent nature of the modern global economy and risks isolating the US, both economically and politically.
There’s actually a history within United States as well. Herbert Hoover was the 31st president, in 1930, he passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, and it worsened the Great Depression. Trump has also inherited a looming inflation crisis, which actually haunted the Democrat election campaign. A reminiscence of how Bill Clinton cashed in on the recession crisis for his 1991 campaign, which he won. His political strategist James Carville famously said that “ It’s the Economy, Stupid”. Whether Trump will worsen or recover the US economy, the full picture is yet to emerge.
Establishing reliable communication channels is crucial for both nations to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations.
On the foreign policy front, Trump’s immediate challenges are Ukraine and Middle East. These issues have not only dented America’s global prestige but have also put the country into an engagement overstretch. With efforts for a ceasefire flouted by Israel and Ukraine, Asian strategy might become insubordinate to the issues Washington faces in Europe and Middle East. The looming unpredictability is what adds to the anxieties of global actors. Political Scientist Paul Poast contends that “ Trump is predictably unpredictable when it comes to foreign policy.”
While China has always viewed Taiwan as a sensitive and non-negotiable issue, its approach to Trump-era provocations remained cautious. In the lead-up to a potential second Trump administration, China’s primary goal is clear: to secure a reliable and authoritative communication channel with Washington. This channel would help China assess Trump’s stance and prepare for policy shifts while managing domestic expectations. Beijing and other countries in Asia-Pacific and Europe are now at a crossroads, balancing internal priorities with external pressures from the U.S. and its allies.
As China seeks stability, particularly in its relations with other Asia-Pacific nations, the need for a clear and reliable diplomatic process with the U.S. is critical. For policymakers in Beijing and Washington, recognizing the potential for missteps—and the profound consequences they may carry—could be the first step in crafting a more stable bilateral framework in an era of intense competition.
Hammad Waleed is a Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad.
