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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was finalized in 2015, sought to curb Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief, and Russia served largely as a facilitator. Russia had the historical advantage of managing Iran’s enriched uranium as well as providing nuclear fuel, as noted in What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? | Council on Foreign Relations. Russia originally served as a stabilizing presence in the JCPOA, as it employed its technical expertise to facilitate the management of Iran’s surplus enriched uranium and downscaled its nuclear infrastructure.
Russia has transitioned from JCPOA facilitator to a geopolitical actor leveraging Iran ties for sanctions relief and strategic gains.
In allowing these, Moscow was able to claim diplomatic leverage while respecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) structure. Diplomats of this deal, and specially Mikhail Ulyanov, celebrated the deal because of realism, and argue that tensions related to Ukraine would not stand in the way of talks. This position drives Russia’s wider policy of increasing its influence in the Middle East and serving as a competitor to American power.
But in 2022, due to the escalation of Western sanctions, Russia’s priorities changed. It started using the JCPOA negotiations to demand exemptions for trade with Iran. It was the initial indication that Russia was using its role in the nuclear deal as a weapon to blunt the impact of sanctions. Russia’s participation in the JCPOA also fulfilled its wider geopolitical objectives. Through these treks into Middle Eastern affairs, Moscow hoped to extend its influence beyond its assigned place in the Sun. Such geopolitical jujitsu permitted Russia to maintain relations with not only (eventually) Iran but also other regional players, most notably Saudi Arabia and Israel, thereby bolstering its image as a pivotal actor in global diplomacy.
The Ukraine invasion hastened Russia’s dependence on Iran. Under Western isolation, Moscow reached out to Tehran for military hardware, including the Shahed-107 attack drone, a reconnaissance UAV that could home in on advanced Western artillery systems in Ukraine. This ad hoc cooperation took formal shape with the establishment of a strategic partnership between Iran and Russia by January 2025 under Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow, as discussed in Will Iran and Russia’s Partnership Go Nuclear Under Trump? The accord, intended to shield each regime from sanctions and intensify defence ties and explicitly favoured joint efforts in “peace and security,” a Chinese euphemism for countering NATO. It is also solidifying authoritarian power, with Russia dependent on Iranian drones and expanded nuclear projects, as detailed in Putin Hypes Possible New Nuclear Projects in Iran.
In February 2025, the US and Russia held talks–principally in Saudi Arabia–to end the Ukraine war and normalize relations, as reported in US and Russia agree to explore mutual opportunities of end to Ukraine war | Ukraine | The Guardian. In February 2025, the US and Russia held talks, principally in Saudi Arabia–to end the Ukraine war and normalize relations including the nuclear program, as mentioned in Iran: Putin to Help Trump Broker Nuclear Talks With Tehran. On March 4, 2025, Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, confirmed this, as in Putin Spokesman Confirms Russian Offer to Mediate Between U.S. and Iran Over Iranian Nuclear Program.
March 14, 2025, Tri-party meeting between China, Russia and Iran in Beijing on Iranian Nuclear question, as reported in China, Russia, Iran to hold nuclear talks in Beijing on Friday | Reuters. During the meeting, which was attended by deputy foreign ministers, participants called for the lifting of US sanctions and for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, as per China, Russia and Iran call for end to U.S. sanctions on Iran and restart of nuclear talks | PBS News. But just days later, on March 18, 2025, President Trump and President Putin spoke over the phone and agreed to seek out a “limited cease-fire” in Ukraine. They also touched on preventing future Middle East conflicts, agreeing that “Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel,” as reported by Trump, Putin agree to seek limited ceasefire in step to ending Ukraine war, White House says | PBS News. That could suggest a potential convergence in efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program.
Post-Ukraine war diplomacy and Trump-Putin engagements signal a possible Russian pivot away from Iran toward U.S.-aligned regional stability.
Russia’s evolving orientation is driven by several factors: the potential for a cease-fire in Ukraine, with talks taking place in Saudi Arabia and Moscow, and the prospect of warmer ties in a Donald Trump administration. An article from the Stimson Center dated February 28, 2025, titled Iran Fears US-Russia Reconciliation Could Come At Its Expense, mentioned that the need for financial integration with Iran may be less urgent, and with-it Russia’s dependence on the partnership.
Russia seeks to balance its relationships in the Middle East, keeping its relationship with Israel, (which values Russia’s presence in Syria as a counterbalance) intact, as per Israel’s complicated but strategic relationship with Russia could strengthen with Trump in the White House. That may require solidarity with U.S. interests in countering Iran’s nuclear program. Russia could demand a quid pro quo for supporting US efforts on Iran such as sanctions relief or US recognition of Russia’s interests in Ukraine. According to the Bloomberg article, this was included in the talks in Saudi Arabia.
As US-Russia relations potentially normalize, Russia might have less motivation for its economic interactions with the Iranians and the cancellation of sanctions might change its demands. An Iran with nuclear weapons is a regional wild card capable of inducing instability, kicking off arms races, straining relationships, and posing significant risks to Russia’s security interests, as noted in The Coming Iranian Nuclear Challenge in 2025 | The Iran Primer.
The phone call on March 18, 2025, between Trump and Putin involved agreements acting to bind Russia’s new position. Equating cooperation on Iran with progress in Ukraine gives a concrete reason, as reported in The Trump-Putin Phone Call: Some Promise, Some Disappointments, and Many Questions | CSIS. Any departure could risk potential gains from better US relations, such as economic agreements and geopolitical stability, as per President Donald J. Trump’s Call with President Vladimir Putin – U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia. Moreover, due to Russia’s need to balance its ties to Israel and preserve regional stability, it is constrained to this role as well.
Essentially, this also offers an opportunity for a new texture towards the Iran nuclear deal that may include tougher measures or the signing of a new one. The snapback timeline of October 18, 2025, as noted in 2025 will be a decisive year for Iran’s nuclear program, may also be a matter of contention, and Russia can either support or not oppose snapback if it happens to be aligned with U.S. interests. But there are lingering doubts, as warned in Don’t Trust Russia to Mediate the Iran Nuclear Deal, not least because of Russia’s relationship with Iran, which may find it hard to drop its interests for a neutral mediation.
Russia’s balancing act between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. could redefine the future structure of nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East.
Russia’s realignment away from Iran is motivated by strategic and economic interests, especially the prospect of favourable ties with the United States and dividends from a cease-fire in Ukraine. This necessitates a careful approach from the international community in managing the complex aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and advancing regional dynamics — all framed by Russia’s dual message.
The author Aamna Zaheer is an undergraduate student and research intern. Her expertise lies in analyzing how security issues influence the decision-making of foreign policy.
