Raqia Ismail Hassan
Established in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations was conceived as a safety net against global conflict. Its foundations were established during a time when many of the countries in the global south emerging as world leaders today endured colonial rule. Designed to manage a world dominated by five superpowers, nearly eighty years later, the same power dynamic is expected to govern a global order defined by rising powers and regional blocs.
Global governance is no longer rooted in a single centre of authority under the five permanent members of the UNSC. This diffusion of power, often described as multipolarity, reflects the growing cooperation of states, shaped by emerging powers and not influenced by Western actors. Yet institutions designed for consensus among a few have struggled to adapt.
The veto power granted to China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States was implemented primarily to require unanimity for military actions in order to maintain world peace and security. India’s rise as the world’s fourth largest economy shows a consistent pattern of power imbalance, as it continues to hold no greater authority than a general member state.
UN governance today is misaligned with current power realities. A multipolar world could make the UN more vital, since if no single country can dictate world order, countries would be more likely to turn to the UN for collective security and mediating disputes. At the same time, a multipolar world could also transcend into more competition, friction and instability between rising powers. History demonstrates that when global institutions fail to adapt to shifting power dynamics, effectiveness can be compromised, which is a vulnerability that weakened the League of Nations.
In practice, the veto power has resulted in multiple Gaza ceasefire proposals being blocked, leading to institutional paralysis that limit the ability of the UN to act on its available resources to maintain international peace and stability. By privileging the authority of a few member states overriding the preference of the majority, the Security Council undermines the democratic practice of upholding the will of the majority diminishing the UN’s credibility.
Beyond representation, the UN’s legitimacy is further questioned due to the prevalent gap between authority and adherence. While the permanent members yield unparalleled influence, those with the greatest decision making powers are not always the most compliant with the rules they are tasked to uphold as evident from the assessments of Charter alignment. For many countries in the Global South, this reinforces the perception that their opinions carry little weight in an organisation where power is concentrated in the hands of a few.
As confidence in fair representation in the UN deteriorates, states seek alternatives where their position is better supported. The emergence of regional and Global South centred blocs such as BRICS serves as a response and a symptom of institutional stagnation. For many countries in the Global South these alliances provide a stage where their economic and political views are more closely aligned. This gradual turn towards alternative alliances shows that when global institutions fail to adapt, states don’t abandon cooperation but instead try to diversify them. The greater risk for the UN therefore is not competition but decreasing influence in an increasingly shifting global order.
What could a fairer UN look like? Reform does not require tearing down pre-existing structures but would require redirecting efforts to uphold institutional leverage and restore effectiveness. This could include limiting the use of veto during instances of mass humanitarian crises, strengthening procedures that ensure compliance with the UN Charter and formalising cooperation with regional blocs like BRICS rather than competing for relevance.
At the same time, it is important to understand that the UN’s capacity to operate depends heavily on financial contributions from its most powerful members. The US particularly bears a disproportionate share of the burden. From this perspective, influence can be viewed as a product of investment and expecting leverage over organisation decisions can hypothetically be viewed as a rational outcome.
However, rationality does not necessarily translate into justification within a multilateral institution founded on collective governance.
Adaptability to emerging power structures will eventually determine if the UN maintains its relevancy. In an increasingly interconnected world, relevance will depend not on who holds power, but on how inclusively it is exercised.
The author is a scholar of Economics at the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Her academic interests focus on economic security, non-traditional security challenges, and the intersection of economics and geopolitics, with a particular interest in how economic policy shapes national and regional stability.
