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Ayesha Liaquat
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), established in 2015, aimed to prevent Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for uplifting the economic sanction. However, its status has evolved since then, with the agreement facing challenges particularly due to the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from the deal under President Donald Trump. Despite efforts to revive the deal through subsequent negotiations, the JCPOA’s future remains uncertain. This article examines the historical development of the nuclear deal, exploring motivations behind Iran’s nuclear program, the perception of threats to the U.S., flaws in JCPOA, and the way ahead.
The JCPOA’s expiration in 2025 calls for urgent renegotiation to prevent nuclear escalation.
Historical Development of Iran’s Nuclear Program Iran’s Nuclear Program has been a central point of contention in U.S.-Iran relations but It was not always the case. During the mid-20th century, the U.S. actively supported Iran’s Nuclear Program under Reza Shah Pahlavi. The program began in 1957 with the support of the U.S. and other Western countries as part of the “Atoms for Peace” initiative. Eventually 1967, Iran’s first Nuclear Research Center was established. Shah envisioned a large-scale nuclear energy program that would replace Iran’s dependence on oil and natural gas.
However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution turned the tide in Iran. The emergence of Ayatollah Khamenei led to the rise of anti-western rhetoric and the abandonment of the nuclear Program in the country. It was not until the Iran-Iraq war that Khamenei realized the need for possessing Nuclear Technology thus the program was revived now with the support of China, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Russia, and Czechoslovakia with varying degrees of assistance.
The Underlying motivation behind Iran’s nuclear program can be understood from a rational actor perspective which entails that possession of nuclear weapons will provide protection from regional and global forces that constantly exert pressure on Iran. These pressures include the encirclement threat by the U.S., Israel’s nuclear program, and the notion that to be a great power a state needs to possess a nuclear weapon.
Since the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. has been uncertain about Iran’s intentions in the Middle East due to several reasons. First, a sense of superiority among Iranians will likely make them want to dominate the Middle East. Second, the Possession of nuclear weapons by Iran will affect the balance of power in the region, leading to an arms race. Third, nuclear-equipped Iran will pose a threat to U.S. interests and allies i.e. Israel in the Middle East. Fourth, Iran has a history of provocative actions and supports militant groups in the region which directly threatens regional and global security. These reasons have amalgamated to push the U.S. and other Western countries to pursue roads towards negotiation.
Iran’s uranium enrichment now exceeds JCPOA limits, raising concerns about nuclear proliferation.
Beginning in 2006, the U.S., European Union, and the UN imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program, which raised concerns that it was secretly developing nuclear weapons. Due to these sanctions, Iran faced the loss of $ 10 billion in revenue between 2012-2014 alone. International sanctions and their economic impact pressured Iran to reach a nuclear deal. Consequently, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between UNSC permanent members plus Germany p5+1 and Iran, was reached in 2015.
The agreement restricted Iran from pursuing nuclear enrichment and required monitoring and verification by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). On the other hand, the signatories were required to uplift sanctions and the UN ban on the transfer of conventional weapons after certification by the IAEA that Iran is only engaged in civilian nuclear activity.
The JCPOA is set to expire in 2025 thus a need for renewed agreement is required for Iran’s nuclear program. Previously, in 2018 Trump had withdrawn from JCPOA calling it “flawed”, leveraging Iran to continue its uranium enrichment. Under the JCPOA, Iran was allowed uranium enrichment up to 3.67% to maintain a stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds).
Iran put stockpile at 8,294.4 kg (18,286 pounds) i.e. 60%, which is 20 times more than allowed3. U.S. Intelligence Report 2024 has stated that Iran has accelerated its nuclear enrichment and limited the monitoring and verification activity of the IAEA. Additionally, the support and assistance to proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Palestinian territory by Iran pose serious threat to regional security and peace.
The JCPOA critics addressed several flaws in the agreement. First, the deal had temporary restrictions for up to 10-15 years on nuclear enrichment. Second, the agreement did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program, which continued to expand and allegedly possess the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Third, the IAEA faced delays in inspection and monitoring activities in several military facilities. Lastly, sanctions relief and financial gains provided Iran with enough economic incentives to fund proxies, resulting in proxy conflicts across the region.
A renewed deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile program and ensure strict IAEA monitoring.
A renewed deal is required to ensure that signatories buy maximum time to extend Iran’s nuclear program. In contrast, the Trump administration has adopted a policy of “maximum pressure” and calls for a “comprehensive agreement”, addressing all the limitations of the previous deal. In his presidential campaigns, he described the deal as the “worst deal in history”.
Trump administration should move towards peaceful means of negotiation instead of pursuing stringent policies that could result in conflict escalation. The new deal could address previous limitations including restricting Iran’s ballistic missile program, extending the sunset clause up to 15 years, and ensuring effective monitoring and inspection of the IAEA. Otherwise, the nuclear program will continue to threaten the security of the region.
Ayesha Liaquat studies Great Power Politics, Emerging Blocs, and shifting global alliances, focusing on how changes in power dynamics impact international security and global stability.