Muhammad Saad Arshad
Following the last year Pakistan and Indian confrontation and changing security dynamics in Middle East, Pakistan, KSA, Turkey, Qatar moving toward an integrated regional co-production hub from an import-dependent procurement model. Such collaboration brings strategic relevance for the Pakistan Military Industrial Complex following three strategic MoUs/pacts, including the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia in September 2025; the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in August 2026; and the Badr Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Pakistan, Türkiye, Qatar and Indonesia in October 2026.
The Badr MoU acts as an institutional basis for defence-industrial cooperation, joint research and development (R&D) and technology transfer, while the Makkah Pact acts as a collective defence framework.
This alliance becomes more relevant against the backdrop of Pakistan’s changing security environment. The Operation Sindoor military interaction with India in May 2025, along with escalating border skirmishes with Afghanistan in 2026, has highlighted the rising prominence of advanced military techniques in the realm of asymmetric warfare. In this context, technological self-reliance is becoming a strategic need for Pakistan to confront the security threats on its eastern and western borders simultaneously.
First, let’s have a look at the capabilities Pakistan has and what it lacks. It possesses well-established manufacturing grounds, including Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), and Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT). These facilities have demonstrated considerable proficiency in producing small arms, ammunition, heavy armour, and combat aircraft, exemplified by Al-Khalid, Al-Zarrar Tanks, G3 rifles, MP5, and the JF-17 Thunder programme. Pakistan also possesses indigenous missile development capabilities following the production of advanced Fatah series and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) including Burraq, Shahpar- II, Shahpar- III, and Uqab.
However, it continues to rely on advanced imported electronic components, Avionics, Radars, Air defence systems, and high-level subsystems, limiting its technological independence. Manufacturing traditional warfare equipment or assembling imported parts alone cannot guarantee the ability to independently design, upgrade and sustain sophisticated defence systems.
The eastern frontier presents increasingly complex conventional challenges. Operation Sindoor illustrated the significance of integrated air defence, persistent air surveillance and precision-guided weapons. India’s tiered air-defence matrix, such as the Russian S-400 Triumf and its own evolving home-grown Project Kusha programme, poses a huge challenge. Pakistan consequently requires stronger suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), advanced anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), electronic countermeasures and airborne surveillance capabilities. Also, research into hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and the development of advanced standoff weapons is required following Indian missile-defence technology advancements.
The other challenge is the western frontier. Mountainous terrain along the roughly 2,600-kilometre Pakistan-Afghanistan border makes surveillance difficult, allowing the use of low-flying commercial and modified drones. Dawn reported that in 2025, the Pakistani security forces were attacked by at least 405 quadcopters, and in the first six months of 2026, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police foiled 341 attacks. These events reflect the capability of relatively low-cost UAVs to threaten civilian populations, police stations, and military installations.
To counteract this vulnerability, there is a need for continuing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) platforms, surveillance aerostats, satellite imaging, and distributed ground sensor networks. Pakistan also needs cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities. The cost of launching expensive surface-to-air missiles, like LY-80 and HQ-17AE, against inexpensive commercial drones is economically untenable. The addition of Turkiye’s programmable airburst counter-drone system, the ŞAHİN 40mm, is an improvement, but continued advances in electronic jamming, directed-energy weapons, and high-power microwave systems could enhance low-cost interception options.
The strategic relevance of the Badr MoU and Makkah Pact for Pakistan is that they could complement national capabilities to tackle the above-mentioned weaknesses. Saudi Arabia and Qatar can provide investment capital for infrastructure and R&D; Türkiye brings advanced aerospace, UAV, naval and electronic warfare technologies; while Pakistan and Indonesia contribute engineering expertise, manufacturing facilities and operational experience.
This collaboration could be a platform for the co-production of UAVs, Loitering Munitions, precision-guided ammunition, modular air-defence platforms, radar technologies, and electronic warfare suites. Cooperation in naval operations could boost the production of corvettes and frigates locally, and joint software development centers could facilitate AI-powered surveillance and secure military communication.
Equally important is developing domestic semiconductor capabilities, advanced materials, and ammunition supply chains. Joint manufacturing and technology transfer could therefore improve supply-chain resilience and reduce dependence on external procurement. Such arrangements, however, would need sustainable financing as well as clear intellectual-property agreements and actual industrial commitment rather than political declarations.
These new defence agreements provide an avenue for Pakistan to expand its technological range of dependency and serve as a supplement to its ongoing defence ties with China. These alliances will only be successful if Pakistan is able to translate the potential into domestic industrial capability. The goal should not be only to acquire sophisticated armaments, but to develop a technologically resilient and self-sustaining military-industrial complex in an increasingly complex two-front security environment.
Muhammad Saad Arshad is an IR graduate from QAU and former Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intern in Islamabad.
