Shift in the German Foreign Policy after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: An Analysis of Zeitwende Speech of Olaf Scholz

Ramsha Arif

Three days after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz delivered his famous “Zeitenwende Speech” to the Parliament. Scholz described the attack as a historic turning point for Europe as the name implies- Zeitenwende (literal meaning times-turned) which means change from one age or era to another and announced a radical shift in the traditional German foreign policy (Ostpolitik) as a result. Putin’s attack on Ukraine is expected to change Germany in ways that will affect its relationship with the European Union, the United States, and Eastern Europe. Thus, this speech was one of the most important recalibrations of German foreign policy since its unification in 1990 as Germany woke up to the reality of the geopolitics of 2022.

For decades, Germany had relied on the security umbrella provided by the United States on one hand and the other, continuing its Ostpolitik towards Russia—an “eastern policy” based on a plethora of social, economic, and political relations. During the 1970s, Germany embarked on having close relations with Russia as the successive governments considered a cooperative relationship a necessity for peaceful Europe. To accompany this process, Germany intensified its economic connectivity with Russia with a view that Moscow would not risk these links with its hostile policies that would disturb the status quo and its profits. As a result of this, Germany itself became ever more dependent on Russia, especially its gas. Even after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, these cooperative policies remained intact until it took the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to completely discredit both policies.

Russo-Ukraine war has resulted in the most profound transformation of German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. In its security and defense policy, Germany announced to break with the post-Cold War tradition of underfunding the military and embarked on the ambition to assume a leading military role in Europe. The Chancellor declared that his government would spend a €100 billion fund to strengthen its armed forces, the Bundeswehr, reversing its previous cautious defense policy. Additionally, he pledged that the defense spending would exceed 2% of GDP, a requirement of NATO membership that Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) had traditionally opposed. This dramatic increase in defense spending proved to be good news for NATO. He acknowledged the fact that enhancing Germany’s military spending was vital for its security and Europe’s future. However, it is not actually about spending more money on defense but it is about how the money is spent, and how governments collaborate for the training, equipment, and modernization of the armed forces. It is about resilience that Germany and its allies need to acquire.

At the same time, Scholz’s government agreed to provide military support to Ukraine, ending its ban on sending weapons to conflict zones, which was another major U-turn from its traditional foreign policy. He also committed to sending an air defense system in response to Russia’s continued attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Germany also pledged to continue support for the European Union, which was certainly a message to Vladimir Putin that he would not succeed in driving a wedge between the E.U. members.

Furthermore, Germany’s perception of the Eastern European countries is constantly changing because of the war in Ukraine. Successive German governments viewed their Eastern neighbors through the lens of Russia but those days are now over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova where Russia’s meddling is a great threat to their sovereignty and independence. This puts the stability and security of the region at risk having repercussions for the European Union. For this reason, Scholz’s government underlined the need to work much more closely with the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, and Poland as their anti-German law and justice make co-operation relatively difficult.

About energy policy, Germany bid farewell to its previous approach of “change through trade” (Wandel durch Handel) and has radically reduced its dependency on Russian gas and oil. Germany decided to stop the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline that made it increasingly dependent on Russian gas and provided Putin with a powerful instrument to blackmail Germany. Today, Germany’s reliance on Russian gas has almost reduced to zero, which means it is now committed to diversifying its energy sources and speeding up its renewable energy sector. 

A noteworthy aspect is that, although Germany had declared some significant changes in its foreign policy, Scholz’s government also made a strong commitment to uphold some other German foreign policy traditions like its support for NATO, European integration, international cooperation, and an international order based on rules, not power politics. 

The above-mentioned changes and transformations in German foreign policy have some long-term implications beyond Russia as well. The discrediting of its policy of “change through trade” will not only affect its dealings with Russia but also underpin Germany’s connections with other countries like China. As Germany’s economic linkages with China are even closer than with Russia, this can be a serious headache for Berlin, particularly since there is a possibility that Beijing will pursue a more aggressive policy towards Taiwan.

Olaf Scholz’s government has not yet come up with an answer to the question of how Germany’s policy towards China will be affected due to the disastrous collapse of its traditional foreign policy approaches. As Russia has cut off gas supplies to Germany, it has to immediately look for other suppliers, which may be some of the Middle Eastern countries with a rather questionable democratic and human rights track record. Until recently, Wandel durch Handel was a justification for doing business with such states but now it will be a massive problem for an export-oriented trading state like Germany. Also, Germany has always been reluctant to assume a strong leadership role within Europe or globally. However, if it is willing to lead, to propose new visions based on its successful pillars of foreign policy (e.g., European integration, multilateralism, and a rules-based international order), and to help sustain them, Germany’s power, influence, and prestige will surely grow as a result of Zeitenwende. 

The writer is a student of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad.