The Loose Link:  How Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Endanger National Security?

Hammad Waleed

The recent detonation of numerous Pager devices and Handheld Walkie-talkies in the streets of Beirut has sparked intense discussions about the pressing need for secure access to equipment. It is becoming increasingly clear that establishing resilient supply chains impervious to sabotage or compromise by adversaries is of the utmost importance. The explosions, which affected both civilian users and military operators, have brought to light the vulnerability of daily-use devices in both civilian and defence settings during times of conflict.

The explosions, which affected both civilian users and military operators, have brought to light the vulnerability of daily-use devices in both civilian and defence settings during times of conflict.

The pager explosions offer a harrowing glimpse into the intricate web of supply chains, whether in military or civilian use. The attacks on 17th September, extensively captured on camera, revealed small Pager devices erupting in numerous locations such as supermarkets, bedrooms, pharmacies, and hospitals, causing widespread panic and fear. Lebanese authorities have reported nearly 12 fatalities and at least 2750 injuries. Hezbollah and Lebanese officials have attributed the attack to Israel, citing the sophistication of the operation, which bears the hallmarks of Israeli intelligence agencies known for their innovative yet ruthless methods. Interestingly, Israeli Intelligence also killed Hamas’s Chief Bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, in 1996 in a similar manner by using an explosive-filled mobile phone.

In the wake of the unfolding events in Lebanon, analysts are unravelling the intricate details of the recent attack. Their investigations have led them to the doorstep of Gold Apollo, a Taiwan-based company, which produced the AR-924 pagers that were detonated during the initial phase of the assault. Despite attempts to distance itself from the incident, the company faces severe reputational damage due to the detonation of its devices and allegations of exporting to the banned organization Hezbollah. Further supply chain scrutiny has revealed a complex web of imports through subsidiary companies based in Hungary, Norway and Bulgaria, particularly involving BAC Consulting in Hungary. This has prompted arrests in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Norway. Additionally, reports from The New York Times suggest that Israel orchestrated the operation using shell companies.

This susceptibility might invoke protectionism, but that, too, has limitations as sophisticated equipment would still be imported.

Throughout the history of warfare, the use of sabotage operations and retrofitting adversary’s devices with booby traps has been a recurring and pervasive tactic. From the Vietnamese employing explosives in food cans to Rhodesians utilizing Parathion insecticides to target guerillas, the ingenuity and ruthlessness of such tactics have left a lasting mark on the annals of warfare.

The susceptibility of supply chains for small devices has opened a Pandora’s box of possibilities for malicious intent. The impact of such small equipment on warfare outcomes can be catastrophic, as exemplified by the events in Lebanon. Following the Pager attacks, Hezbollah leaders gathered for a clandestine meeting in Beirut, only to have it targeted and bombed by the Israelis. This resulted in the reported killing of Hezbollah’s top military commander, Ibrahim Aqil, and several other elite commanders.

As observed in intelligence operations, sabotage operations have often been employed to target high-value individuals such as politicians, commanders, or intelligence assets through creative and inventive means. Globalization has led to industrial diversification, where a single piece of equipment, like a wireless phone, comprises components from different areas of the supply chain. Its receiver might be made in one country, the signal antenna in another, and the chipset would have another origin. However, those governments issuing tenders for bulk orders often overlook the intricacies of apparently non-combat systems, leaving room for potential vulnerabilities to be exploited.

The security imperative, in this case, becomes conditional on the integrity of the supplier, not the buyer.

It is not as simple as it may sound, as the possibilities are staggering. Everything from basic equipment like walkie-talkies and army MREs ( Meal ready-to-eat) to advanced technology like computers and CCTV cameras can be compromised due to vulnerabilities in the supply chain. Militaries and organizations worldwide struggle to thoroughly vet every piece of equipment, especially when dealing with numerous suppliers. There are simply too many diffusion venues to control. The dragnet of  securing of operational equipment has evident limitations in this case. Countries cannot produce an entire piece of equipment independently because the company manufacturing it does not either. This dilemma of insecure factory lines to unpredictability on the front lines is a dilemma that has returned to haunt military strategists, especially in Global South countries which tend to rely majorly on exports to meet their security and functional requirements. The security imperative, in this case, becomes conditional on the integrity of the supplier, not the buyer.

As established above, sabotage operations are not new, but the recent Lebanon attacks have highlighted their potential scale. They demonstrate how “Trojan Horse” tactics can be used to lay dormant for long periods before causing devastating effects, acting as “sleeper cells

It’s not viable to call back hundreds of thousands of equipment materials to verify security, which can result in huge setbacks on a strategic level, as was the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranians when their nuclear centrifuges were sabotaged ( albeit through cyber warfare where malware was injected in computer systems). Similarly, additional checks come with additional costs in resources and dedicated manpower. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of electronic equipment adds another layer of complexity. A seemingly harmless landline phone could be used for civilian purposes or placed in the homes of influential individuals for more nefarious reasons.

one can foresee such tactics being widely used by states against non-state adversaries or vice versa as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes increasingly blurred.

To ensuring supply chain integrity in a world where a single piece of equipment involves many manufacturers in different places is arduous. This susceptibility might invoke protectionism, but that, too, has limitations as sophisticated equipment would still be imported. However, this vulnerability might add another layer of deterrence for the originator, who may have more advanced ( and sinister) methods at their disposal than traditional means.  As a researcher fixated on security issues, I can foresee such tactics being widely used by states against non-state adversaries or vice versa as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes increasingly blurred. This scenario may sound like a dystopian novel where every device is compromised, no equipment is safe from breach, and there is nowhere to hide.

Hammad Waleed is a Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad.