Hafsa Aslam
Water is no longer simply an environmental concern. As climate change alters rainfall patterns, populations grow and agriculture demands more resources, freshwater is becoming increasingly connected to national security and international politics. It is also about dependence, geography, infrastructure and how states manage resources that cross political borders.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 with the involvement of the World Bank, created a framework for sharing the Indus river system between India and Pakistan. The eastern rivers were allocated primarily to India, while the western rivers the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were allocated primarily to Pakistan. The treaty also created mechanisms for information sharing and dispute resolution.
Its remarkable feature was its endurance. It survived wars, diplomatic crises and decades of hostility between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Yet that history is now under serious pressure. Following the 2025 crisis between India and Pakistan, India placed the treaty in abeyance, while Pakistan rejected the move and maintains that the treaty remains legally binding.
This has changed the water debate. The question is no longer simply whether a treaty designed in the twentieth century can manage a twenty-first-century water crisis. It is also whether water cooperation can survive when the agreement itself becomes part of a wider geopolitical confrontation.
The political discussion often presents a simple picture: India is upstream, Pakistan is downstream, and therefore India can control Pakistan’s water. Large-scale infrastructure takes time, and a river system cannot simply be switched off like a tap. But that does not mean Pakistan has nothing to worry about.
The real concern is leverage and uncertainty. Projects such as Kishenganga and Ratle have already shown how technical disagreements can become diplomatic disputes. Pakistan’s vulnerability therefore does not depend on India having an unlimited ability to stop its rivers. It comes from downstream dependence, geopolitical rivalry, climate uncertainty and domestic weaknesses.
Those domestic weaknesses deserve equal attention. Pakistan faces inefficient irrigation, groundwater depletion, pollution, changing rainfall patterns and growing urban demand. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on irrigation, making water management inseparable from food security. Even if tensions with India disappeared tomorrow, Pakistan would still face a serious water-security challenge.
Protecting trans boundary water arrangements is important, but so is making sure that the water Pakistan already receives is not wasted, polluted or poorly distributed. Water governance cannot remain focused only on securing supplies; it must also address how efficiently those supplies are used.
The Indus Delta illustrates this wider problem. Water security cannot be measured only by how much water is available for farms and cities. Reduced freshwater flows have affected ecosystems, agriculture, fisheries and livelihoods. Pakistan therefore needs to look beyond dams and storage and give greater attention to irrigation efficiency, groundwater management, water quality and ecological flows.
Climate change makes the challenge even harder. The Indus Basin depends on rainfall, snow melt and glaciers, while changing temperatures and precipitation can affect both the timing and availability of water. Pakistan can experience devastating floods while also facing longer-term water stress. Water insecurity does not necessarily mean running out of water; it can also mean water arriving at the wrong time, becoming difficult to predict or being poorly distributed.
This changing environment makes reliable information increasingly important. Better hydro-logical data, early-warning systems and communication between water authorities can help countries prepare for floods, droughts and changing river flows. At the same time, transparent communication can reduce the risk that technical disagreements are misunderstood as deliberate political actions.
The Indus is part of a wider global pattern. Central Asia faces tensions between upstream hydropower interests and downstream agricultural needs, while the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile basins have also become sites of competition over dams, agriculture and water flows.
The pattern is increasingly clear: upstream geography can create leverage, downstream dependence can create vulnerability, climate change adds uncertainty, and political mistrust can turn technical disputes into geopolitical ones.
Yet shared rivers do not inevitably lead to conflict. They can also create incentives for cooperation. The history of the Indus Waters Treaty demonstrates this. India and Pakistan maintained water cooperation through periods of war and political hostility. The challenge now is to preserve that principle in a changing environment.
Future water diplomacy will need to account for climate change, population growth, agricultural demand and new infrastructure. Better data sharing, flood and drought forecasting, and transparent communication could help prevent technical disputes from becoming strategic crises.
For Pakistan, protecting water security therefore requires both diplomacy and domestic reform. It must protect effective mechanisms for managing the Indus while improving irrigation efficiency, regulating groundwater, reducing waste and strengthening climate resilience.
The Indus offers a choice. Shared water can become a source of strategic competition, or it can become an incentive for cooperation. The difference will depend not only on who controls the water, but on whether states build institutions capable of managing their shared vulnerabilities before scarcity, climate change and mistrust turn those vulnerabilities into crises.
Hafsa Aslam is a student of public policy at the Government College University Lahore, with a growing interest in foreign policy, diplomacy, and international relations. She is passionate about public policy discourse and hopes to contribute to informed conversations on Pakistan’s place in the world.
