Javohir Boliyev
In Central Asia, helping young people find jobs and preparing them for legal employment abroad may seem like a sensible government policy. Yet this policy is creating a paradox: while governments are opening new labor markets for young people, these very channels are becoming costly, complicated, and increasingly dependent on intermediaries.
The issue is becoming even more important as economic growth slows and higher energy prices and supply disruptions add to inflationary pressures. The Asian Development Bank expects growth in developing Asia and the Pacific to slow to 4.9 percent in 2026, while higher energy costs are expected to add to inflationary pressure.
However, it would be wrong to place the entire problem on government policy. Political and economic changes in Russia, the war in Ukraine, tighter controls over migrants, and discrimination are also pushing Central Asian workers to look for new destinations.
Since 2022, worsening conditions in Russia have encouraged countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to pay greater attention to diversifying migration routes. The problem, therefore, is not the opening of new labor markets itself; it is that the mechanisms designed to protect migrants are not developing at the same pace as these new opportunities.
The numbers confirm this shift. Between 2021 and 2024, employment permits issued to Central Asian citizens in the European Union nearly tripled, reaching almost 79,000. The United Kingdom has also expanded seasonal employment opportunities for Central Asians: in 2024, citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan accounted for more than 78 percent of the 35,600 seasonal visas issued under the relevant scheme.
This expansion is valuable because a job unavailable at home may exist abroad. But when formal migration channels become expensive, a higher nominal wage does not necessarily translate into higher real income for the migrant.
This is where the problem becomes more serious. Access to new destinations often requires recruitment agencies, visas, language training, and other services. As a result, migrants face costs even before leaving home and may become heavily dependent on intermediaries or employers.
In Uzbekistan, the number of licensed private recruitment agencies increased from eight in 2019 to 50 in 2026, while the government strengthened licensing, digital monitoring, and pre-departure training requirements. These two policies may appear contradictory: the state is expanding migration opportunities while also imposing tighter regulation. Yet regulation itself is not the problem; the problem begins when regulation increases migrants’ costs and weakens their bargaining power.
Looking back over the past two decades, labor migration to Russia has helped ease pressure in Central Asia’s domestic labor markets by absorbing workers who could not find sufficient opportunities at home. Since the early 2000s, Russia has relied on migrant labor for its economic growth, while Central Asian economies have used migration to move surplus labor away from agriculture and other low-productivity sectors that could not absorb it.
That older model is now becoming weaker. Although new destinations are emerging, they do not offer the same easy and relatively inexpensive access. As a result, migration opportunities may appear to be expanding for young people, while the cost and risk of accessing them are also rising.
From an economic perspective, the logic of labor mobility is straightforward. Workers tend to move toward places where wages and employment opportunities are higher. When one country has an excess supply of labor, migration can reduce pressure on its domestic labor market, while the receiving country gains workers where shortages exist.
This can improve production and the overall efficiency of resource use. Migrants can fill jobs in construction, transport, and other sectors that are less attractive to local workers, while highly skilled migrants can help address shortages in technology, healthcare, and other essential areas.
Yet the outcome for the home country cannot be measured only by the money migrants send back. The permanent departure of skilled young people can weaken innovation, public services, and long-term economic growth. Tajikistan illustrates this dependence particularly clearly: remittances amounted to 48 percent of GDP in 2024. This shows how migration can support household incomes while also making an economy highly dependent on foreign labor markets.
The answer, therefore, is not to restrict migration but to improve its quality. Central Asian governments should expand legal migration channels, strengthen oversight of recruitment agencies, make contracts and fees transparent, improve consular protection abroad, and create better opportunities for returning workers to use their skills at home.
Otherwise, migration will not solve youth unemployment; it will simply move part of the problem to another country. The political economy of the issue makes reform difficult: the benefits enjoyed by intermediaries and other organized groups are concentrated and visible, while the interests of young workers and their families are more dispersed.
As a result, policymakers may prefer short-term, visible outcomes over deeper reforms. Central Asia should aim not simply to export young workers, but to build a migration system that brings back their skills, income, and experience and turns them into stronger human capital and higher domestic productivity.
Javohir Boliyev is a BSc student majoring in International Economics and Management at UWED. His academic background includes advanced training certificates with UNCTAD, ADBI, and HSE ICEF. He is dedicated to mastering data-driven economic strategies and international development.
